HIC RHODUS HIC SALTA !

oder: zur Prolegomena einer Philosophie des politisch Undenkbaren.

Keine Sorge – wir setzen keine Kantsche oder Hegelsche (oder gar Marx’sche) Begrifflichkeit voraus – im 21. Jahrhundert, im Zeitalter von TikTok. Künstlich geschürte Ängste oder Besorgnisse sind nicht unser Thema, sondern politische – global, national oder lokal gedachte – Chancen, Strategien, Wünsche.

HIC RHODUS HIC SALTA

Hypothese:

Wenn künstlich aufeinander gehetzte Raubkatzen wie Saudi-Arabien und der Iran es schaffen – durch kluge und strategisch orientierte Vermittlung – ihre tiefgreifenden politischen Gegensätze im Sinne einer höheren Zielstellung hintenanzustellen, warum sollten nicht auch Politerinnen und Politiker in diesem Lande es nicht auch schaffen, Gemeinsamkeiten zu suchen und ihre Anhängerscharen von einem höheren strategischen Konsensus und übereinstimmenden Zielstellungen zu überzeugen?

Zeilenvergleiche, Themenvergleiche, Artikelvergleiche von „Junge Welt“ und „Junge Freiheit“ –

Suche nach Gemeinsamkeiten und Paralellen, die Ansatzpunkte für solche minimale Interessenübereinstimmungen bieten.

„Junge Welt“ vom 24. März 2023. Ausgewählt zum Vergleich habe ich die folgenden Artikel:

Jörg Kronauer „Kein fester Block – Beijing treibt in Moskau Friedensprozess voran. Kooperation gegen polische und ökonomische Dominanz des Westens „, S. 3

ders. „Tiefgreifende Veränderungen – Xi und Putin skizzieren Überwindung westlicher Dominanz und Weg zur Multipolarität“, S. 3

Alexander Reich, „Habeck, China und der Hamburger Hafen – Betreiber HHLA braucht Cosco-Konzern mehr als andersherum, Wirtschaftsministerium blockiert“. S. 9

Arnold Schölzel, „EU-Gipfel in Krisenzeiten – Gelähmt vom Kriegführen“, S. 8

Gerd Schumann, „Weiße Flecken – Die Grünen, Jugoslawien, die Ukraine und einige verblüffende Analogien in der Entstehungsgeschichte von nzwei Kriegen“, S. 12

Parallel dazu bieten sich folgende Beiträge in der „Jungen Freiheit“ (gleichfalls vom 24. März) an:

Dieter Stein, „EU-Sanierungszwang – Betreutes Wohnen“, S. 1

Kurt Zach, „Willkommen im Parteienstaat – Streit um Wahlrechtsreform: Wie die Ampel-Koalition plant, die Demokratie weiter auszuhebeln“, S. 1

Hans Krump, „Weltmachtsansprüche im Visier – Der Schriftsteller Wolfgang Bittner wertet den von Putin begonnenen Ukraine-Krieg als bloße geopolitische Abwher eines von den USA mit langer Hand beabsichtigten Regimewechsels in Rußland“, S. 28

Bruno Bandulet, „Haftbefehl gegen Putin – Eine Geste, die nicht weiterhilft“, S. 2

Hinrich Rohbohm, „Wildes Vietnam – Saigon: Zwischen modernen Neubauten, westlichen Investitionen und chinesischer Einflußnahmebraut sich ein geopolitischer Konflikt in Ostasien zusammen“, S. 12

Junge Freiheit, S. 12

André Kruschke, „Links-grüne Regierungsparteien schaffen die freiheitlich-demokratischen Grundwerte ab – Die Politik zerstört das Wir“, S. 18

Junge Freiheit, S. 18

Schließlich: Einsam, ohne Parallele steht ein Beitrag in der Jungen Welt, S. 6: Seymour Hersh, „Die Vertuscher – Biden-Regierung versucht weiter, ihre Verantwortung für Zerstörung der Nord-Stream-Pipelines zu verbergen“

Junge Welt und Junge Freiheit, zwei „Zeitenwende“-Printmedien – lesbar und trefflich gestaltet, zum Nachdenken und Weiterdenken anregend. Die Junge Welt feierte vor kurzem ihren 75. Geburtstag, ein überregionales „Zeitenwende“-Gewächs aus den Sommermonaten nach dem Sieg der Alliierten über den NS-Faschismus im Jahr 1945. Die Junge Freiheit, 38. Jahrgang, regional und bescheiden gegründet also 1986 am Vorabend der nicht absehbaren Zeitenwende (= Zusammenbruch des sozialistischen Weltsystems).

  • * * *

Prophetie ist „nicht unser Ding“. Aber gesunder Menschenverstand, genährt durch geschichtliche Erfahrungen, sagt uns: Wir sind wieder an einer Zeitenwende – geopolitisch und auch national? Ganz gewiß !!!

  • * * *

Geopolitisch hat der von den USA geführte „westliche“ Staatenblock durch die aggressive umfassende Politik gegenüber Russland und China der letzten dreißig Jahre den Zenit der Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Rest der globalen Staatenwelt nicht nur erreicht, sondern schon den Beginn der Talfahrt eingeläutet. Eine solche Unumkehrbarkeit zeigt sich auch auf nationaler Ebene in Deutschland mit der seit 2005 zuerst verschleierten, dann aber seit Ende 2021 offenen Wende zu einer aggressiven, antidemokratischen und antisozialen Innenpolitik, geführt vor allem von international vernetzten extrem konservativen, antidemokratischen Gruppierungen in der Partei der Grünen und der Sozialdemokratie. (Zu empfehlen ist das Studium der Beiträge unserer genannten Medienvertreter : JF S. 28, JF S. 2, JF S. 12; JW S. 3, JW S. 8)

Bemerkenswert ist ebenfalls die Dominanz dieser Gruppen in den Medien, in den Institutionen des offiziellen, staatlich geförderten Kulturbetriebes, der offen neokolonialistischen Politik in den multinationalen Organisationen, den Bereichen Sport, Bildung, Freizeit und Tourismus. (Beiträge JW S.9, S. 12, JF S.1)

Ein offenkundiges Indiz für das Erreichen und das beginnende Überschreiten des Scheitelpunktes, des Wendekreises dieser epochalen Entwicklung sowohl geopolitisch als auch auf nationaler Ebene ist in den führenden Staaten des „westlichen“ Blocks das Zerschlagen jeglicher ernsthaften politischen Opposition in Form von Parteien, schlagkräftigen Organisationen, Medien,. parlamentarischen Vertretungen auf nationaler und regionaler Ebene.

Junge Freiheit

Manche Passagen in den erwähnten Beiträgen könnte man als weltanschauliche Zivilisationskritik abtun – à la Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Benn. Aber es ist weitaus mehr ! Spürbar ist – und sowohl die konservative „Junge Freiheit“ als auch die kritisch-liberale „Junge Welt“ – sind da auf einer Linie: die globale Bewegung unterhalb der Tektonik ! Man ist geneigt mit Galilei zu formulieren: Und sie bewegt sich doch ! Der in den nächsten Jahrzehnten sich verstärkende unterirdische Druck auf die scheinbar festgefügten Platten des internationalen Systems wird zu Beben führen, deren Ergebnisse abhängen werden von der ökonomischen und finaziellen Stärke des sich in ersten Keimen abzeichenden „Gegenblocks“ unter Führung Chinas, Russlands, Indiens und anderer nach Verbindung mit ihnen strebenden Staaten. Insofern ist die eingangs erwähnte aktuelle qualitative Veränderung des Saudiarabisch-iranischen Verhältnisses für die politischen Seismologen eine wichtige Kennziffer, auch wenn sie aus verschiedenen Gründen sich noch nicht öffentlich zu dieser Erkenntnis durchringen können oder wollen.

Junge Freiheit

Wie verstehen, dass Momentaufnahmen, Symptome, Ahnungen weltpolitisch noch keine eindeutige Tendenz ausmachen. Um so mehr trifft das auf die inneren politischen Verhältnisse in der Bundesrepublik zu !

Junge Welt

Was spürbar ist, lässt sich ebenfallos an den sporadischen tektonischen Bewegungen, der nationalen Krisen der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte ablesen. Die wachsende Unruhe, die Besorgnisse, die Ängste in breiten Kreisen der Bevölkerung vor dem Hintergrund der Bankenkrise, der mit der unkontrollierten Massenmigration und der CORONA-Pandemie verbundenen sozialen und sozialpsychologischen Probleme, schließlich der aktuellen Verstärkung der Russophobie, reißen den braven Bürger aus dem behaglichen Ohrensessel vor dem Fernseher und zwingen ihn zur Suche nach neuen politischen Lösungen und Losungen, nach Alternativen. Wer fragt da nun nach den traditionellen LINKS oder RECHTS ?

Junge Welt, S. 6

Neue Entwürfe sind gefragt, aber nicht nur intellektuell, sondern praktisch-politisch. Und da sind wir wieder bei RHODUS angelangt! Nun doch Antike, Kant, Hegel, Marx! Was soll es bedeuten – Hic Rhodus, hic salta – ? Nichts anderes als das Turnierpferd dazu zu überreden, die Blockade vor dem scheinbar unbezwingbaren Hindernis aufzugeben und den Sprung zu wagen! Der Beifall des Publikums ist Pferd und Reiter gewiß. Die politische Billigung wird jenen Politikerinnen und Politikern sicher sein, die klassische aber nunmehr nicht mehr gültige Gräben überwinden und überspringen, die die Plakatierungen „LINKS“ und „RECHTS“ abwerfen und das Gemeinsame suchen, die ersten Triebe der Schneeglöckchen unter dem dünner werdenden Eis der Winterdecke pflegen, die sich dem von Vertretern der alten Verhältnisse geprägten Vorwurf des Extremismus widersetzen.

Also mit dem Hegelianer Karl Marx zu sprechen (MEW Bd. 8, S. 118): die gegenwärtigen Revolutionen “ … schrecken stets von neuem zurück vor der unbestimmten Ungeheuerlichkeit ihrer eigenen Zwecke, bis die Situation geschaffen ist, die jede Umkehr unmöglich macht, und die Verhältnisse selbst rufen
Hic Rhodus, hic salta!
Hier ist die Rose, hier tanze!“

Dr. Dieter Weigert, Berlin Prenzlauer Berg, 28.März 2023

Signale des Wendekreises

Verrechnet: die USA sitzen in der selbst ausgelegten Falle

Solch ein Glücksfall ist selten: einer der für Deutsche (noch) nicht gesperrten internationalen TV-Kanäle zeigt heute (25. März 2023) das Interview mit einem US-amerikanischen Politologen zum brennenden Thema Perspektiven des Krieges in der Ukraine. Anlass des Interviews ist die Veröffentlichung eines Beitrages jenes Politologen in der namhaften Zeitschrift „Foreign Affairs“ in der jüngsten Ausgabe. Der Name des Mannes: Andrew J. Bacevic, seine Heimatuniversität war bis zu seiner Emeritierung die Boston University.

March/April 2023 cover

Er überschreibt seine Gedanken mit den griffigen Zeilen –„The Reckoning That Wasn’t – Why America Remains Trapped by False Dreams of Hegemony“ – für uns Prosaisten umschrieben etwa – Die Rechnung, die nicht aufging – warum Amerika gefangen bleibt in den faslschen Träumen von Hegemonie !

Der Kern der Analyse: seit dem II. Weltkrieg träumt Amerika von der globalen Hegemonie – ökonomisch und militärisch. Siegreich aus dem Weltkrieg hervorgegangen, erweisen sich nun nach Jahrzehnten diese Träume als Illusion ! Die militärischen Mißerfolge in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan haben in den Köpfen der Eliten aber nicht zu realistischen Konsequwnzen geführt, sondern zu der verhängnivollen Schlußfolgerung, zu dem Mythos – die Welt verlangt nach noch mehr amerikanischer Militärmacht. Angesagt aber ist ein Weckruf – vergleichbar mit dem Signal für die Briten von 1956 – dem Rückzug von Suez! Der entscheidende Satz in dem Artikel lautet daher:

„Der Krieg in der Ukraine könnte eine letzte Chance für Washington bieten, eine Suez-ähnliche Lektion zu lernen – und ohne sogar eine Niederlage zu erleiden.“
Bevor ich mich in den Details der Gedankenführung von Professor Bacevic verlaufe, gebe ich Ihnen, den Lesern den Original-Wortlaut – in Englisch, da bei Übersetzungen oft die Feinheiten der historischen und politikwissenschaftlichen Logik verloren gehen.

120612-N-LE393-170 NEWPORT, R.I. (June 12, 2012) Andrew Bacevich, from Boston University, speaks during a panel discussion that was part of the 2012 Current Strategy Forum at the U.S. Naval War College. This year’s forum explores global trends and the implications they have on national policy and maritime forces. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Eric Dietrich/Released)

Foreign Affairs Magazine Homepage

The Reckoning That Wasn’t – Why America Remains Trapped by False Dreams of Hegemony

By Andrew J. Bacevich

March/April 2023

Published on February 28, 2023

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/andrew-bacevich-the-reckoning-that-wasnt-america-hegemony

Over the course of many evenings in 1952 and 1953, when I was a kindergartner, my family gathered around a hand-me-down TV in the Chicago housing project where we lived to watch Victory at Sea. With stirring music and solemn narration, this 26-part documentary produced by NBC offered an inspiring account of World War II as a righteous conflict in which freedom had triumphed over evil, in large part thanks to the exertions of the United States. The country had waged a people’s war, fought by millions of ordinary citizens who had answered the call of duty. The war’s outcome testified to the strength of American democracy.

Here was history in all its seductive and terrible magnificence. Here, too, was truth: immediate, relevant, and compelling, albeit from a strictly American point of view. If the series had an overarching message, it was this: the outcome of this appalling conflict had inaugurated a new age in which the United States was destined to reign supreme.

The series had a profound effect on me, reinforced by the fact that both of my parents had served in the war. For them and for others of their generation, the great crusade against Germany and Japan was to remain the defining event of their lives and seemed destined to define the lives of future generations, as well.

Yet Victory at Sea hinted at difficulties ahead. The concluding episode was titled “Design for Peace” but offered nothing of the sort. Instead, it conveyed something more akin to a warning. “One bomb from one plane and 78,000 human beings perish,” the narrator intoned, as a camera panned across images of a devastated Hiroshima. “Two bombs, and World War II is over.” Grainy footage of liberated concentration camps and scenes of homeward-bound troops flickered across the screen. Then, with a cryptic reference to “the free world on its march to tomorrow” and a quote from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill extolling the importance of resolution, defiance, magnanimity, and goodwill, the series simply ended. To discern what the most devastating conflict of all time signified politically or morally, viewers would have to look elsewhere.

The abrupt ending made a certain amount of sense. After all, by the time Victory at Sea aired, certain wartime U.S. allies had become bitter adversaries, a race was underway to build nuclear weapons even more lethal than those the United States had dropped on Japan, and American troops were once more engaged in combat, this time in Korea, in a conflict that would not end in even the approximation of victory. If anyone had a design for peace, it had been shelved. This much appeared certain: American global supremacy would not be uncontested.

Even so, for most Americans, World War II remained the authoritative source of relevant memory, with the Cold War a sequel of sorts. Just as U.S. leadership in World War II had defeated the Third Reich and imperial Japan, so, too, would Washington turn back the Soviet threat and ensure the survival of freedom. As the two events merged in the country’s collective imagination, they yielded a canonical lesson: U.S. global leadership backed by superior military power had become a categorical imperative.

In fact, the hard-won victory of 1945 would turn out to be neither validation nor harbinger. It proved instead to be a source of illusions. In the 1960s, the costly and divisive war in Vietnam seemed to demolish those illusions; the collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s momentarily revived them. The post-9/11 misadventures Washington undertook in pursuing its global “war on terror” once again exposed the claims of U.S. military supremacy as specious.

The U.S. foreign policy establishment has clung to the myth that what the world needs is more American military power.
The disappointing outcomes of the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq should have sounded a wake-up call akin to the one experienced by the United Kingdom in 1956, after the British government orchestrated an intervention to reassert its control of the Suez Canal and, more broadly, put Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in his place. The ensuing debacle resulted in a singular humiliation that cost British Prime Minister Anthony Eden his job. Eden’s rival, British Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell, described the Suez operation as “an act of disastrous folly” that did “irreparable harm to the prestige and reputation of our country.” Few observers disputed that judgment. The crisis obliged the British to acknowledge that their imperial project had reached a dead end. The old way of doing things—whipping weaker peoples into line—was no longer going to work.

The past two decades might have functioned as an extended “Suez moment” for the United States. But the U.S. foreign policy establishment has refused to move on, clinging to the myth that what the world needs is more American military power. The failure in Iraq did not prevent Washington from doubling down on its “good war” in Afghanistan—an act of rashness that culminated in a chaotic, humiliating withdrawal in 2021.

That spectacle could have served as an occasion to declare an end to the era defined by World War II, the Cold War, and the aspirations to which they gave rise. But thanks in no small part to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the moment soon passed. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revived the postwar tradition of American muscle flexing. The Afghan war, the longest in U.S. history, has all but vanished from memory, as has the disastrous war of choice that Washington launched 20 years ago in Iraq. Partly as a result, the country seems poised to continue making the same mistakes that led to those debacles, all justified by the ostensible obligations of global leadership.

The war in Ukraine might offer one last chance for Washington to learn a Suez-style lesson—and without even suffering a defeat. So far, U.S. policy on Ukraine has been pragmatic and arguably restrained. But President Joe Biden and his team routinely talk about the war in ways that suggest an outmoded, moralistic, and recklessly grandiose vision of American power. Aligning his administration’s rhetorical posture with a sober assessment of the true stakes involved in Ukraine might allow Biden to wean the establishment from its obsession with hegemony. Demonstrating that Americans do not need their country’s role in the world explained to them in the style of a children’s bedtime story would be a bonus.

The danger is that the opposite could happen: Biden’s framing of Ukraine as a crucible for a new era of military-backed American dominance might lock him in, and his administration’s carefully calibrated policy could come to more closely resemble his soaring, ill-considered rhetoric. That, in turn, would lead to an altogether different and more disastrous reckoning.

WITH US OR AGAINST US

The most authoritative expression of the postwar worldview—the Rosetta stone of American statecraft in the Cold War—is NSC-68, a highly classified document drafted in 1950 by the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, led at the time by Paul Nitze. Testifying to “the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society,” this ideologically charged document established the parameters of U.S. policy throughout the Cold War. Juxtaposed against that free society was “the slave society” of the Soviet Union, which demanded “total power over all men within the Soviet state without a single exception” along with “total power over all Communist Parties and all states under Soviet domination.”

With compelling clarity, NSC-68 made a case for American hegemony. It drew bright lines and erased ambiguities. “In a shrinking world,” the document asserted, “the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable.” This fact imposed on the United States “the responsibility of world leadership” along with an obligation “to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy.” Merely containing the Soviet threat would not suffice. Nor would feeding the world’s hungry or succoring the afflicted. What the United States needed was the capacity and willingness to coerce. With that in mind, Washington committed itself to establishing a dominant military configured as a global police force. Statecraft became an adjunct of military might.

Undiminished by the passage of time, the Manichaean outlook woven into NSC-68 persists today, decades after the Cold War that inspired it. Biden’s frequent insistence that the fate of humankind hinges on the outcome of a cosmic struggle between democracy and autocracy updates Nitze’s central theme. The necessity of U.S. military supremacy—whether measured by Pentagon spending, the number of bases abroad, or a propensity to use force—has become an article of faith. As the world continues to “shrink” thanks to globalization and technological progress (and also to expand into space and cyberspace), the reach of U.S. military forces grows accordingly, a process that stirs little controversy.

But if the aim of U.S. hegemony has been to establish global order and justice through the prudent use of hard power, the results have been mixed at best. Since 1950, people in the English-speaking world and those living in some proximity to Paris and Tokyo have fared relatively well. By comparison, the benefits accruing to the billions living in the global South have been spotty; only occasionally has the opportunity to live longer and healthier lives translated into personal freedom and security. Government respect for individual rights and adherence to the rule of law remains more hope than reality.

Things could have been worse, of course. Imagine, for example, if during the Cold War, the United States had used any of the thousands of nuclear weapons it had acquired at enormous cost. Yet what actually did occur was bad enough. To reflect on the conduct and the consequences of American wars (and sundry covert interventions) since 1950 is to confront an appalling record of recklessness, malfeasance, and waste.

The Iraq war, which began 20 years ago, represents the acme of American military folly—second only to the Vietnam War. Launched with expectations of unleashing a tidal wave of liberation that would transform the Middle East, Operation Iraqi Freedom instead produced a mournful legacy of death and destruction that destabilized the region. For a time, supporters of the war consoled themselves with the thought that the removal from power of the Iraqi tyrant Saddam Hussein had made the world a better place. Today, no amount of sophistry can sustain that claim.

Many ordinary Americans might consider it too harsh to declare that all the sacrifices made by U.S. troops since World War II have been for naught. But it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the result in Iraq was more akin to a rule than to an exception. President Harry Truman’s decision to send U.S. troops north of the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 was an epic blunder, albeit one eclipsed 15 years later by President Lyndon Johnson’s decision to commit U.S. combat troops to Vietnam. Beginning in 2001, the war in Afghanistan gave new meaning to the term “quagmire.” As for Iraq, it remains impossible to refute Barack Obama’s 2002 denunciation, delivered when he was a state senator in Illinois, of the approaching U.S. invasion as a “dumb,” “rash,” “cynical attempt” by “weekend warriors” to “shove their own ideological agendas down our throats.”

Yet in each case, those choices served as concrete expressions of what American global leadership seemed to require in the moment. According to the logic embedded in NSC-68, to pass by the opportunity to liberate and unify the two Koreas or to allow the Republic of Vietnam to fall to communism would have been the height of irresponsibility. So, too, would allowing the Taliban to retain power in Kabul. Take seriously the claim that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction (and was intent on developing more), and his removal could be seen as a political and moral imperative.
In each instance, however, egregiously faulty judgment squandered—there is no other word—vast troves of American wealth and thousands of American lives (not to mention hundreds of thousands of non-American lives). Brown University’s Costs of War project has estimated that U.S. military actions since the 9/11 attacks have cost around $8 trillion, a sum several dozen times greater than that approved for the Biden administration’s highly touted “Building a Better America” infrastructure initiative. And it is hard to see how the benefits of those military operations outweighed the costs.

Yet the basic logic that favored intervention in all those cases remains intact. Even Biden, who as vice president opposed a major surge of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and who as president ultimately withdrew the troops, has not forsaken a fundamental belief in the enduring efficacy of American military power. His response to defeat in Afghanistan was to propose an increase in Pentagon spending. Congress not only agreed but chipped in a bonus.

WHICH IKE DO YOU LIKE?

The clout wielded by the sprawling U.S. national security apparatus partially explains why this mindset has persisted. On that score, the famous admonition conveyed in President Dwight Eisenhower’s farewell address in January 1961 has lost none of its relevance. In that speech, Eisenhower warned against “the disastrous rise of misplaced power” in the hands of “the military-industrial complex.” He also proposed a solution: “an alert and knowledgeable citizenry” to keep the country’s “huge industrial and military machinery of defense” in check “so that security and liberty may prosper together.” But his hope was misplaced. On matters related to national security, Americans have proven to be more indifferent than watchful. Many Americans still revere Eisenhower. But it is not the president of 1961 to whom they tend to look for inspiration but the general of 1945, who secured the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich.

The victory in World War II bestowed a new sense of purpose on U.S. policy, which was subsequently codified in NSC-68. But it also imposed a straitjacket. As the scholar David Bromwich has recently written, “The Second World War is the picture that has held us captive.” In important respects, the story of U.S. national security policy over the past seven decades centers on an effort to preserve and update that picture. The overarching aim has been to engineer another such victory, thereby delivering security, prosperity, deference, and privilege—or, more broadly, a world run on American terms, a dominance justified by a self-assigned mission to spread freedom and democracy.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, followed by the collapse of communism and the U.S. victory in the 1990–91 Gulf War seemed, for a brief moment, to bring that world within reach. Here were victories that, taken together, arguably compared in scope to that of 1945. The alleged “end of history” had resulted in a unipolar order over which a sole superpower presided as the world’s “indispensable nation.” Today, such phrases fall into the same category as “white man’s burden” and “the war to end all wars”: they can only be employed ironically. Yet they accurately reflect the intoxication that overtook political elites after 1989. Never has a country putatively devoted to noble causes created or underwritten more mayhem than did the United States following the Cold War, as it set out to smite evildoers everywhere.

Washington’s ideology-fueled bender lasted until 2016, when Donald Trump upended American politics. As a candidate for president, Trump vowed to chart a different course, one that would put “America first.” That seemingly benign phrase had explosive connotations, harking back to widespread popular opposition to possible U.S. intervention on behalf of the United Kingdom as it resisted Nazi aggression. Trump was not simply promising a less belligerent foreign policy. Knowingly or not, he was threatening to jettison the moral underpinnings of postwar American statecraft.

Trump’s mendacity and historical illiteracy made it hard to tell whether he even grasped what the phrase “America first” signified.

NATO countries were “not paying their fair share” and were “ripping off the United States,” Trump complained during a characteristic rant at a 2016 campaign rally. “And you know what we do? Nothing. Either they have to pay up for past deficiencies or they have to get out. And if it breaks up NATO, it breaks up NATO.” He returned to this theme again and again, including in his inaugural address. “We’ve defended other nations’ borders while refusing to defend our own, and spent trillions and trillions of dollars overseas, while America’s infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay,” Trump declared. “We’ve made other countries rich while the wealth, strength, and confidence of our country has dissipated over the horizon.” Not anymore, he pledged: “from this day forward, it’s going to be only America first.”

Such heresies triggered a nervous breakdown from which the U.S. foreign policy establishment has yet to fully recover. Of course, Trump’s mendacity and historical illiteracy made it hard to tell whether he even grasped what the phrase “America first” signified. And even if he did, his staggering incompetence and short attention span allowed the status quo to survive. During Trump’s term in office, the endless war that started after 9/11 dragged on. Alliances remained intact. With minor adjustments, so, too, did the country’s military footprint abroad. At home, the military-industrial complex prospered. A costly modernization of the U.S. nuclear strike capabilities continued, attracting minimal attention. All in all, the essentials of the NSC-68 paradigm survived, as did the conviction that World War II somehow retained its relevance as a policy touchstone. “Isolationist” remained an epithet hurled at anyone not supporting the vigorous use of U.S. power abroad to cure the world’s ills.

Yet even as establishment thinking about the U.S. role in the world remained mired in the past, the world itself was undergoing profound changes. And herein lies a central paradox of the Trump presidency: Trump’s vow to abandon the postwar paradigm led the establishment to circle the wagons and mount a spirited defense of the NSC-68 framework—even as the United States confronted a rising tide of problems to which that framework was all but irrelevant. The list is long: the rise of China, a deepening climate crisis, a loss of control of the U.S. southern border, the evaporation of working-class opportunities, skyrocketing drug-related fatalities, a brutal pandemic, and domestic upheaval spurred by polarization along racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, partisan, and religious lines. Those divisions fueled Trump’s election in 2016, allowed him to win an even larger number of votes in his losing reelection campaign, and made possible his effort to prevent the peaceful transfer of power and overthrow the constitutional order in the wake of his defeat.

THE MYTHMAKERS

These cascading failures and shortcomings and the inability of the postwar vision of U.S. power to contend with them seemed to herald a Suez moment. Instead, in the history of U.S. statecraft, the Biden presidency marks a turning point when things didn’t turn. Midway through Biden’s term, U.S. grand strategy is mired in a tangle of unacknowledged contradictions. Preeminent among them is Washington’s insistence that the United States must sustain the now hallowed model of militarized global leadership even as the relevance of that model diminishes, the resources available to pursue it dwindle, and the prospects of preserving the country’s privileged place in the international order decline. Yet the foreign policy establishment insists there is no conceivable alternative to militarized American leadership—pointing above all to the Russian invasion of Ukraine to make its case.

In this view, the war in Ukraine revalidates NSC-68. But the Russian army is not the Red Army—not even close. Unless Putin opts to use nuclear weapons, an unlikely scenario, Russia poses a negligible threat to the security and well-being of the United States. A Russian army that can’t even make it to Kyiv doesn’t pose much of a danger to Berlin, London, or Paris, much less to New York City. The ineptitude displayed by Russia’s military reinforces the argument that European democracies, should they make the effort, are more than capable of providing for their own security. In sum, for Washington, the war should have bolstered the case for classifying Russia as someone else’s problem. If the United States has nearly $50 billion to spare (the amount that Congress allotted to assist Ukraine between February 2022 and November 2022), it should use that money to alleviate climate change, address the border crisis, or ameliorate the distress of working-class Americans—vital tasks that the Biden administration treats with far less urgency than arming Ukraine.

Biden has spoken of the war in Ukraine in sweeping terms that echo the rhetoric of earlier eras. “Now is the hour: our moment of responsibility, our test of resolve and conscience of history itself,” he intoned in a State of the Union address delivered barely a week after Russia invaded Ukraine, in February 2022. “And we will save democracy.” Such a moment and such a task would seem to involve not only demonstrating commitment and resolve but also making sacrifices and hard choices. But the U.S. effort in Ukraine has not required those things; it is a proxy war, and Biden has wisely pledged that despite the alleged existential stakes for democracy, no U.S. troops will fight on behalf of Ukraine. Harking back to NSC-68, administration rhetoric, compounded by an endless stream of media commentary, has created the impression that the Ukraine war has summoned the United States to once again grab the tiller of history and steer humankind toward its intended destination. But this is precisely the sort of hubris that has led the country astray time and again.

It is hard to imagine a better chance to move past this self-satisfied posturing and find a more responsible way to talk about and understand the U.S. role in the world—but Biden seems determined to miss the opportunity. Consider this passage from the administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy:

Around the world, the need for American leadership is as great as it has ever been. We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order. Meanwhile, shared challenges that impact people everywhere demand increased global cooperation and nations stepping up to their responsibilities at a moment when this has become more difficult. In response, the United States will lead with our values, and we will work in lockstep with our allies and partners and with all those who share our interests. We will not leave our future vulnerable to the whims of those who do not share our vision for a world that is free, open, prosperous, and secure.

This word salad offers something for everyone but is devoid of specificity and cannot serve as a basis for a coherent policy. Marketed as a statement of strategy, it instead testifies to the absence of strategy.

THE KENNAN WAY

What the United States needs today is a clear statement of strategic purpose that will replace the zombie NSC-68 paradigm. Almost unnoticed, such an alternative has been available ever since the heady days following the U.S. victory in World War II. In 1948, at the outset of the Cold War, George Kennan, Nitze’s predecessor as director of policy planning, proposed an approach to measuring the success of U.S. policy that was devoid of ideological fantasies. Noting that the United States at that moment possessed “about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population,” he suggested that the task ahead was “to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security.”

The aim was to keep Americans safe while preserving and even enhancing the material abundance that made the United States the envy of the world. Achieving that goal, according to Kennan, would require the United States “to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming” and concentrate “on our immediate national objectives.” The country could ill afford “the luxury of altruism and world-benefaction,” Kennan wrote.

Kennan’s long memorandum outlined in considerable detail how the United States should deal with the problems of the postwar world. That world no longer exists. So it is not the particulars of his analysis that should command attention today but the spirit that informs it: realism, sobriety, and an appreciation of limits, along with an emphasis on purposefulness, discipline, and what Kennan called “economy of effort.” In 1948, Kennan feared that Americans might succumb to “the romantic and universalistic concepts” that had sprouted during the recent war. He was right to worry.

Since 1948, the economic disparity to which Kennan referred has dwindled. Yet it has not disappeared: today, the United States accounts for just over four percent of the world’s population but still holds around 30 percent of the world’s wealth. And within the country, the distribution of that wealth has shifted dramatically. In 1950, the richest 0.1 percent of Americans controlled around 10 percent of the country’s wealth; today, they control close to 20 percent of it. Meanwhile, the country’s fiscal health has declined: the total U.S. national debt now exceeds $31 trillion, with the federal deficit having averaged more than a trillion dollars per year since 2010.

A combination of grotesque inequality and feckless profligacy goes a long way toward explaining why such an immense and richly endowed country finds itself unable to contend with dysfunction at home and crises abroad. Military might cannot compensate for an absence of internal cohesion and governmental self-discipline. Unless the United States gets its house in order, it has little hope of exercising global leadership—much less prevailing in a mostly imaginary competition pitting democracy against autocracy.

Washington urgently needs to follow the advice that Kennan offered in 1948 and that generations of policymakers have ignored: avoid needless war, fulfill the promises in the country’s founding documents, and provide ordinary citizens with the prospect of a decent life. A place to begin is to reconfigure the U.S. military into a force designed to protect the American people rather than to serve as an instrument of global power projection. The United States should require the Defense Department to defend.

What might that look like in practice? For starters, it would mean taking seriously the obligation, embedded in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to eliminate nuclear weapons; closing down various regional military headquarters, with U.S. Central Command first on the chopping block; reducing the size of the U.S. military footprint abroad; prohibiting payments to military contractors for cost overruns; putting a lock on the revolving door that sustains the military-industrial complex; reinvigorating congressional war powers as specified by the U.S. Constitution; and, barring a declaration of war, capping military spending at two percent of GDP—which would still allow the Pentagon to lead the world in military expenditures.

In 1947, in perhaps the most famous essay ever to appear in Foreign Affairs, Kennan, using the byline “X,” wrote that “to avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.” Today, those traditions may be in tatters, but Kennan’s counsel has lost none of its salience. The chimera of another righteous military triumph cannot fix what ails the United States. Only the “alert and knowledgeable citizenry” that Eisenhower called for can fill the needs of the moment: a polity that refuses to tolerate the further misuse of American power and the abuse of American soldiers that have become the hallmarks of our time.

ANDREW J. BACEVICH is Professor Emeritus of International Relations and History at Boston University and Chair of the Board of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, which he co-founded.

Mit kollegialen Grüßen, Dr. Dieter Weigert, Politikwissenschaftler aus Berlin, Prenzlauer Berg

WOKE heißt KRIEG

NO WAR NO WOKE

ist das Motto, der Kampfruf meiner von nun an in unregelmäßigen Abständen erscheinenden BLOGS: kein Krieg, kein woke !

Auf gut Deutsch: FRIEDEN, DIPLOMATIE, Respekt gegenüber historisch gewachsenen familiären Werten, Achtung vor der Lebenserfahrung der Älteren, politische und kulturelle Toleranz !

Aktuelles Symbol eines Anti-Wokisten:

Deutschland ist im Krieg mit Russland – vom letzten Königstiger aus der Kriegsbeute der Amerikaner in der Battle of the Bulge (Ardennenschlacht Weihnachten 1944) zum Leopard II !

Wer hätte es geglaubt noch vo wenigen Jahren – die WOKISTINNEN und WOKISTEN kämpfen um ein Bataillon Leopard-Panzer gegen die Russen.

Sie verdrängen mit psychologischer Leidenschaft die global Niederlage in der Fussball-WM in Qatar und das DAVOR und DANACH!

Erinnern wir uns aber an die letzten Wochen: 25. Februar !

Die aus dem medien-verordneten Schlaf Erwachten (also Anti-Woken) wollen keine Leopard-Export-Geschenke an die Banderisten in Kiew. Sie sind geschichtsbewusst:

Vom Prenzlauer Berg aus Berlin – 5. März 2023

Mein Thüringen – begehrt, bekehrt, bedauert

NO WAR !

NO WOKE !

Das ist der Schlachtruf der hier künftig erscheinenden BLOGS: kein Krieg, kein Woke !

Auf gut Deutsch: FRIEDEN, DIPLOMATIE, Respekt gegenüber historisch gewachsenen familiären Werten, Achtung vor der Lebenserfahrung der Älteren, politische und kulturelle Toleranz !

Aktuelles Symbol der friedliebenden Nicht-Woken:

Doch nun zu unseren Thüringern, geschrieben von einem Thüringer in der DIASPORA

Keine Sorge – es geht hier nicht um Dr. Martin Luther, den Mitteldeutschen, den Judenfresser und Bauernschlächter, den die US-Amerikaner so sehr lieben, dass sie zu Scharen bei schönem Wetter Wittenberg und Erfurt heimsuchen ! Es geht um Märchenfiguren in aktueller Verkleidung:

Es war einmal ein im schönen armen Niedersachsen ein Salzsieder, der hatte drei Söhne, Balduin, Bernhard und Bruno.

Balduin,der älteste und größte, erbte die Saline, den beiden anderen, die kleinwüchsig an Körper und Geist geblieben waren, befahl der Vater auf dem Sterbebette, in der Fremde, flußaufwärts von Weser und Werra ihr Glück zu suchen. So wanderten sie entlang der Weser, dann weiter die Werra bergauf,

schlugen sich durch das Unterholz, mieden die Städte und Dörfer aus Furcht vor den Räuberbanden und Wegelagerern, bis sie in der Ferne Salzsieder erblickten. „Hier lassen wir uns nieder“ flüsterte Bruno dem Bruder Bernhard, der etwa träge im Geiste war, ins rechte Ohr, „die Siedlung heißt Salzungen ! Sieh‘ mal, wie die Leute sich tummeln!“

Nach einem erfrischenden Bade machten sie sich auf den Weg, um sich bei einem Salinenmeister zu verdingen. Ach, wie groß war der Schreck! Der Meister und seine Altgesellen wiesen ihnen die Tür -„Euch Wichtel brauchen wir in Thüringen nicht, wir haben genügend einheimisches Gesindel, versuchts doch mal in den Klöstern, die Brüder suchen immer Rechts- und Linksgläubige! Drei Tagesmärsche immer der Sonne nach hat der Mainzer Erzbischof eine Niederlassung, ich wünsche Euch Glück“. Sprachs und knallte ihnen die Tür vor der Nase zu.
Da weinten die Brüder bitterlich und trennten sich, Bruno wendete sich nach links, Bernhard nach rechts. Bruno fand Unterschlupf bei den hessischen Brüdern im Kloster zur heiligen Brüderlichkeit, die ihm bei guter Führung den immerwährenden Sonnenschein und die 20-Stunden-Woche versprachen und einen stolperfreien Aufstieg auf den schmalen Leitern zur Spitze der Gemeinschaft zusicherten, als sie seine Geisteskraft, seine Gerissenheit und Gewandtheit im Umgang mit den Oberen erkannten.

Bernhard jedoch, dem rechten Weg vertrauend, zu dem ihm der Vater im Stillen bei der Erinnerung an früherer Kreuzzüge gen Osten geraten hatte, wanderte stracks zur Mainzer Siedlung am Fluß Gera und fand sofort Gleichgesinnte – entwurzelte Raubritter, Glücksspieler, Tagediebe und Lohnschreiber auf der Krämerbrücke. In der Hinterstube der Bierkneipe „Zum Heiligen Kreuzritter“ erzählten die Alten von den siegreichen Schlachten „damals im Osten“, von den Aufmärschen hinter den Totenkopf-Bannern, vom schmählichen Ende ihrer Träume hier in der thüringischen Einöde. Sie begrüßten den Zuwanderer mit aufgereckten Armen, wählten ihn, der schnell die richtigen Sprüche fand, zum Anführer. Noch sei die Zeit nicht reif zum letzten Gefecht, aber wenn er die Posaune bläst, marschieren sie hinter ihm „wie die Kälber“ hinter dem Hirten – wohin auch immer! Bernhard schwelgte in Glückseligkeit, das war nun seine neue Heimat, wie stolz wäre der Vater, ihn so noch erleben zu dürfen.

Vollkommen war sein Stolz und Glücksgefühl, als er in der Menge bei einer seiner Umzüge im Andreasviertel seinen verloren geglaubten Bruder Bruno erkannte – nicht jubelnd, aber doch anwesend – und ein Banner gegen ihn schwenkend: „Nieder mit den Rechtgläubigen!“
Sie trafen sich in der Nacht und verabredeten für den nächsten Sonntag einen öffentlichen Kampf um die Führung in der Stadt und im Lande Thüringen.

Zur Wahlstatt wurde die an dieser Stlle sehr seichte Gera hinter der Krämerbrücke auserkoren. Die braven Bürger lachten über die gerüsteten, bannerumschlungenen Zwerge auf den Eseln – der rechtgläubige Totenkopf gegen den linkshändigen Sonnenschein! Sonnenschein gelang es, Bruder Bernhard in die stinkende Brühe zu werfen und sich damit den Ehrenplatz im Kreise der Thüringer Edlen zu sichern. Bernhard blieb der Platz hinter ihm in der Hohen Ratsversammlung – der Platz des in den Rücken stichelnden Führers des gegnerischen Lagers.
So hatten sie es sich nun gemütlich gemacht, die zugewanderten armen Brüder von der Weser im goldenen Thüringen.
Damit könnte das Märchen nun zu Ende sein – aber, aber !!!

Die Haß-Liebe der Brüder wurde plötzlich durch den Einfall der Riesen aus dem OSTLAND in das benachbartes Bandennest STEPANKA gestört. Man hatte sich so herrlich eingerichtet mit dem Räubernest STEPANKA – die Thüringer lieferten Speere und Salz, die STEPANKAER stichelten als Gegenleistung an der Grenze zum OSTLAND und verbrannten manchmal auch aufmüpfige OSTLÄNDER (Männer, Frauen und Kinder), die innerhalb ihrer Mauern siedelten, auf Scheiterhaufen und ersäuften sie in den Sümpfen und Flüssen hinten am Dunklen Meer.
Nun aber griffen auch die OSTLÄNDER zum Speer und marschierten gegen STEPANKA. Was erfrecht sich dieser Fürst OSTLANDS ? Unsere beiden Zwergenbrüder – vereint im väterlich eingeflößten Haß gegen OSTLAND – begruben feierlich (natürlich im Geheimen!) ihren Zwist und setzten sich an die Spitze des Kreuzzuges gegen die Ungläubigen – der Rechtgläubige Bernd und der Linksgläubige Bruno. „Mehr Speere für STEPANKA ! Nieder mit dem Fürsten des OSTLANDES ! Verbot aller Lieder und Banner des OSTLANDES in unserem FREIEN REICH !“ tönte es nun auf dem Domplatz der Mainzer Kolonie:

vereint, Arm in Arm die nun endlich vereinten Brüder !!!

Potztausend – was kommt denn da ?

Von der anderen Straßenseite winkten ihnen zwei holde Frauen zu – sie riefen den Brüdern entgegen: „lasst uns doch gemeinsam im handwerklichen Wettkampf dem Osten entgegentreten ! Ohne gepanzerte Waffen, ohne fliegende Drachen!“

Zu Brunos Überraschung bat Bernhard die Frauen um einen Platz in ihren Reihen, diese holde Anhängerschar gefiel ihm – der friedliche Wettstreit kam ihm gelegen, so konnte er dem Bruder die Anhänger abspenstig machen!

Bruno, der nur seiner reinen Lehre folgte, für den seine Follower keinen Frieden mit dem bösen Ost-Tyrannen wollten, musste sich nun von seinem Bruder trennen! Er blieb bei den reich gedeckten Tischen der Herren, verband sich noch enger mit den Rittern unter ihren schwarz-weißen Bannern und führte seine Gläubigen Linksschaffenden ins WOKE Himmelreich – und wenn sie nicht wegen ihrer schweren Panzerhemden in den Sümpfen des Ostens erstickten, träumen sie heute noch von den Reichtümern unter der Schwarzerde der Steppen.

ENDE vom Lied: Aus der sehr enttäuschten BERLINER FERNE – Märchen nach den Brüdern Grimm – Ähnlichkeiten der Brüder mit aktuellen Persönlichkeiten sind nicht angedacht und auch ausdrücklich verboten durch die neueste Bundesgesetzgebung!!!!

Berlin, Prenzlauer Berg, 4. März 2023

Madame, Monsieur, lieben Sie die Russen auch im Krieg ?

Dreifaltigkeitskloster in Sergijew Possad (ehemals Sagorsk, nördlich von Moskau)

Die Laute und Tonverbindungen aus dem Reich der Vereinigten Staaten des Westens und Nordens klingen verstimmt – wenn man auf die Russen zu sprechen kommt! An deutschen Stammtischen lebt die alte Losung von 1914 auf – Jeder Schuß ein Ruß !!! Aber halt – es gibt ja drei Arten von Russen – lieb sind uns die Kleinrussen, die man auch Ukrainer nennt, böse sind die Großrussen und Weißrussen, die wollen unser Oma ihr klein Häusgen nehmen!

Im französischen Bistro (übrigens ein Lehnwort aus dem Russischen) geht es ruhiger zu, da erinnert man sich an die Waffenbrüderschaft mit den Russen zur Zeit der Schlacht um Stalingrad, an die Normandie-Njemen-Alliancen.

Wie ist es nun mit der Liebe der Franzosen zu den Groß – und Weißrussen?

Der in London erscheinende ECONOMIST vom 18. Februar 2023 titelte auf Seite 24 -also nicht ganz vorne – recht missverständlich: „Charlemagne – France’s fatal Russia fascination“. Untertitel: „A long history helps explain why Paris found it hard to break fully with Moscow“, gekoppelt mit einer bluttriefenden Karikatur:

Es soll also der Eindruck vermittelt werden, dass von der Zeit Karls des Großen bis in die Gegenwart der fränkisch-gallische Hahn und der russische Bär miteinander flirteten, dass zwei europäische Großmächte voneinander fasziniert waren, dass Kriege und Gewalt zwischen ihnen letztendlich überlagert wurden durch gegenseitige kulturelle Zuneigung. Als historische Zeugen treten u.a. Voltaire, Diderot, Präsident Chirac, Ministerpräsident Fillon auf.

Die Karte des Mittelalters demonstriert die französische Atlantikküste als westliche und das russische Uralgebirge als östliche Begrenzung des europäischen Kontinents, wobei der Ural Europa nicht nur von Asien trennt, sondern den Übergang zum russischen Sibirien, damit zum asiatischen Kontinent bildet.

Unter dem Dach der gegenseitigen Bestrebungen der französischen und russischen Herrscher nach Dominanz des europäischen Kontinent seit dem Mittelalter sind Kriege, unterschiedliche Militärkoalitionen, gewaltsame Interventionen auf dem Territorium des anderen Staates („regime change“ im WOKE-jargon), ebenso an der Tagesordnung wie wechselnde dynastische Verflechtungen und Bündnisse, Verschmelzungen oder aktive Störungen wirtschaftlicher und kultureller Kontakte.

Was die in London ansässige Redaktion des „ECONOMIST“ nicht kennt oder bewusst verschweigt, sind die differenzierten Beziehungen zwischen russischen und französischen Akteuren, gesellschaftlichen Gruppen, privaten Zirkeln, geschäftlichen Interessenvertretern, dynastischen Kreisen und natürlich familiären Cliquen seit der frühen Neuzeit.

Die einseitige, zum Teil haarsträubend polemische Darstellung des Lebens und des politischen Wirkens des ersten starken Zaren der Neuzeit, Iwan IV, („Iwan Grosny“) in Westeuropa ist ein Musterbeispiel für die sich ausbreitenden Russenfeindlichkeit.

Nehmen wir dieses 16. Jahrhundert – Westeuropa durchlebt grausame Bürgerkriege, in denen Tausende Menschen auf Befehl der herrschenden Dynastie abgeschlachtet werden, in Paris steht dafür exemplarisch die sogenannte Bartholomäusnacht.

Wurde der französische König der „Schreckliche“ genannt oder ging seine Mutter, die verwitwete Königin Katharina von Medici, mit dem Beinamen „die Schreckliche“ in die Geschichtsbücher ein ? Sie stammte aus Italien, nicht aus Russland, da verdient sie ein anderes zivilisiertes Attribut !

Aber Zar Iwan IV., der seine innenpolitischen Gegner zur gleichen Zeit, aus den gleichen politischen Motiven terrorisierte, wurde durch die Gegner und deren ausländische Verbündete zum „Schrecklichen“, obwohl das russische „Grosny“ durchaus auch andere Übersetzungen anbietet.

Englische Historiker der Gegenwart lassen seitenlange „Narratives“ drucken, auf denen sie die Handelswege zwischen Westeuropa und Russland über die Nutzung der Häfen Nordrusslands detailliert darstellen (16. Jahrhundert), betonen dabei die zivilisatorische Rolle der britischen Kaufleute, Entdecker und Seeleute, verschwenden aber kein Blatt ihrer Publikationen zur Beschreibung des historischen Platzes des russischen Reiches in den Jahrhunderten zuvor als Mittler zwischen Europa und den mongolischen, chinesischen und anderen ost- und zentralasiatischen Gesellschaften und deren hochentwickelten wirtschaftlichen und politischen Strukturen. Westeuropäische Historiker und Geschichten-„Erzähler“ verwenden das Attribut „Retter Europas“ zur Kennzeichnung eines russischen Zaren erstmals für das 19. Jahrhundert – für Alexander I., als habe es in den vorhergehenden historischen Perioden die durch Kiew, Moskau, Wladimir, Nowgorod dominierten Staatengebilde und ihre Abwehrkämpfe gegen die Nomadenheere des Ostens nicht gegeben.

Der Helden-suchende Blick des britischen Kaufmannes muss sich notwendigerweise auf jenen Zaren Alexander verengen, der gemeinsam mit dem österreichischen Kanzler Metternich und dem preußischen Friedrich Wilhelm nicht nur den ökonomischen Konkurrenten Frankreich niederhielt, sondern hauptsächlich alle demokratischen Bestrebungen, manche noch eine Erbschaft der französischen Revolution, durch brutale Repression über drei Jahrzehnte ausschaltete.

Was den britischen „Erzählern“ auch abgeht in ihrer Geschichten- Sammlung, ist die starke französische demokratische und revolutionäre Tradition, die die liberale und proletarisch-sozialistische Jugend Russlands in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts als Emigrationsort – fliehend vor dem Terror der Zarenherrschaft – Frankreich wählen ließ. Man lese wieder einmal die Memoiren Ilja Ehrenburgs ! Ob die Redakteure und Schreiberlinge des ECONOMIST diesen Namen überhaupt kennen ?

Alles kann man bei ihm finden: den Brand von Moskau 1812

an der Beresina – den Untergang der Grande Armée im gleichen Jahr:

die Intervention der Engländer und Franzosen im Krimkrieg (in Paris wird man beim Schlendern über die „PONT DE L’ALMA“ daran erinnert):

und schließlich die Intervention gegen Sowjetrussland: die Franzosen nutzen die Niederlage der Türkei und landen Ende 1918 in Odessa, erleiden aber nach Anfangserfolgen strategische Niederlagen.

Legende:

Bürgerlich-nationalistische Kräfte kollaborierten in der Ukraine eng mit den französischen Interventionstruppen zusammen, am 27. Februar 1919 stellte das sogenannte ukrainische „Direktorium“ in einer diplomatischen Note die Ukraine „unter den Schutz Frankreichs“. Schon im Januar/Februar 1919 schlugen die „roten Regimenter“ die vereinten weißgardistischen und französischen Truppen und befreiten Charkow und Kiew.

Lage 1919/1920:

Legende:

Alles sehr aktuell im Jahre 2023 !!!

Für akribische Nicht-WOKISTEN zum Nachlesen:

Genug für heute – vom Prenzlauer Berg – 3. März 2023

Transkarpatien und Väterchen STALIN

Als Stalin im März 1953, also vor 70 Jahren starb, war die Krim noch russisch, hatten sich die Einwohner von Lwow, Uschgorod, Iwano-Frankivsk an ihre staatsbürgerliche Zugehörigkeit zur Sowjetunion gewöhnt, wusste man wo Artjomowsk lag. In München träumten die geflüchteten ukrainischen Nationalisten und Judenmörder von einer Wiederkehr ihrer Herrschaft, die Volksrepubliken Polen, CSSR, Ungarn, Rumänien hatten sich mit dem Verlust von Gebieten, die nun zur Ukrainischen SSR gehören, abgefunden – unter Druck der Stalinschen Großmacht.

Soweit ein Blick in die Geschichte. Aber:

Die Bandera-Verherrlicher in Kiew, Berlin und Umgebung sollten eine Woche lang Gedenkfeiern zum Tode Stalins vor 70 Jahren abhalten, Glocken läuten lassen und wieder Straßen und Plätze nach dem „Generalissimus“ nennen: er hat durch kluge Diplomatie und georgisch-russische Standfestigkeit das Territorium der heutigen Ukraine im Südwesten um Gebiete erweitert, aus denen das antirussische Sentiment in der Gegenwart Kraft schöpft !

Stalins Begräbnis im März 1953:

Worauf beruht die Aktualität des Staatsmannes Stalin gerade in den gegenwärtigen politischen Krisen Osteuropas ? – Erstens aus seiner Abstammung als Georgier an der Spitze des multi-ethnischen Staates Sowjetunion;

zweitens aus seiner internationalen politischen Autorität gegenüber den anglo-amerikanischen Politikern der Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit; drittens seiner Charakterfestigkeit als aktiver Vertreter der territorialen Einheit der Union – Anschluss von Gebieten, die heute von den Bandera-Neonazis als „ukrainisch“ beansprucht werden und aus denen sie verstärkt die antirussische Mobilisierung und Motivation beziehen, in denen sie aber auch die brutale Unterdrückung der Identität der ethnischen Miderheiten betreiben. (Galizien, Transkarpatien, Ruthenien, Bukowina)

Territorien der südwestlichen Ukraine um 1900

Die Niederlage Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg und der Untergang des Zarenreiches 1917 führten zur Entstehung neuer Nationalstaaten in der region Südosteuropas auf der Grundlage von z.T. willkürlichen Grenzziehungen, die den sich ständig verändernden politischen und militärischen Kräfteverhältnissen bis 1939 angepasst wurden.

Das Jahr 1939 brachte mit dem Überfall des deutschen Faschismus auf Polen eine wesentliche Veränderung im Kräftverhältnis der Mächte: der Nichtangriffspakt der Sowjetunion mit Hitler-Deutschland erlaubte Stalin die Verschiebung der Westgrenzen der UdSSR mit dem Ergebnis der Einverleibung von ehemals zaristisch-russischen, 1919/20 durch Polen eroberten Territorien (Galizien mit Lwow) in das sowjetische Staatsgebiet (Ukrainische SSR).

Lwow/Lviv

1940 besetzte die UdSSR Teile des bisherigen „Bessarabiens“ (1918 durch Rumänien annektiert) und die nördliche Bukowina. Nach dem Sieg der Anti-Hitler-Koalition 1945 wurden diese Gebiete vertraglich feste Bestandteile der UdSSR.

Die Karte belegt (die grün eingefärbte Fläche im Südwesten) auch den 1945 erfolgten Anschluss des bis dahin tschechoslowakisch/ungarischen „Ruthenien“, des heutigen „Transkarpatien“ an die UdSSR (Ukrainische SSR).

(Der Anteil der ruthenisch sprechenden Bewohner an der Gesamtbevölkerung Transkarpathiens beträgt nach Schätzungen etwa 62 %.)

Die beiden folgenden Karten demonstrieren die auf sprachlich-ethnischer Identifizierung Unterschiedlichkeit der Bevölkerung der heutigen Ukraine.

Die folgende Karte zeigt den Zusammenhang der sprachlich-ethnischen Gruppierungen der Ukraine, die auf jahrhundertlange historische Entwicklungen zurückgehen, mit den jüngsten politischen Machtverhältnissen:

Während die „galizischen“ Bezirke (Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Wolhynien) ein überdurchschnittliches „antirussisches“ Wahlverhalten („vor-Maidan“) aufweisen, wurde der „pro-westliche“ Präsident Juschtschenko von nur 55 % der Bewohner des Bezirkes Transkarpatien gewählt, was auf den hohen Anteil der Ruthenen an der Gesamtbevölkerung des Bezirkes zurückzuführen ist.

Die Stalin zugeschriebene Annexion der westlichen und südwestlichen Gebiete der heutigen Ukraine (auf die Polen, Ungarn, die Slowakei Anspruch erheben) sind – bis auf die Ausnahme Transkarpatiens – politische Stützen der nationalistischen Eliten in Kiew. Also – es ist Zeit, dem georgisch-russischen Staatsmann STALIN in Kiew ein Denkmal neu zu setzen wie auch in Uschgorod, der Hauptstadt Transkarpatiens.

Vielleicht aber – wenn es noch nicht geschehen ist – im Geburtsort Banderas – neben jenem Haus in Stary Uhrynow im Bezirk Ivano-Frankovik, dem Pilger-Leuchtturm der ukrainischen und europäischen Neofaschisten –

oder auch am Europa-Platz in der Stadt Ivano-Frankivsk neben dem „Monument Stepan Bandera“.

Dennoch – Mit freundlichen Grüßen aus Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg an alle Nicht-Wokisten, auch an Elon Musk !

ECONOMIST – lässt uns einen Blick in die Glaskugel werfen

Pünktlich zu den Festtagen bringt uns das britische REN-Tier, verkleidet als THE ECONOMIST auf dem Schlitten ein Bündel von drei Paketen:

jeweils einen Blick in die GLASKUGEL, gefertigt im Bunker von Kiew und blaugelb eingefärbt! Aber wer zwischen den Zeilen lesen gelernt hat in der Zeit des GROSSEN KALTEN KRIEGES, der erkennt die Zeichen an der Wand !!!

Drei Ukrainer lassen die Meister der Kugel als Luftblasen aufsteigen, ihre Christmas-Message verkünden und dem Mann mit dem KOKS als Heiligenschein verpassen! Eingebettet das Ganze in eine „objektive Analyse“:

Da tritt auf Figur Nummer eins -seine Exzellenz, der Präsident, ehemals und immer noch Komödiant: hinter ihm im Arbeitszimmer die Requisiten – eine OSCAR-Statue, das Geschenk eines amerikanischen Schauspieler-Kollegen, das Buch eines ukrainischen „Historikers“, der im 19. Jahrhundert alles zusammenkratzte, um eine ukrainischen „Identität“ zu begründen sowie das britische Lehrbuch (Verfasser Laurence Reed) für den ungelernten Präsidenten: „Hitler and Stalin: the Tyrants and the Second World War“. Daraus dann die Phrasen des Interview-Parts Mr. Zelenskys.

Die zweite Figur, die aus dem Rauch der Kugel auftaucht, ist General Syrsky:

Beide und auch der dritte Interviewte erhalten vom Meister der ECONOMIST-KUGEL den NICHT-QUALITÄTS-PASS „But neither General Zaluszny nor General Syrsky sounds triumphant … It seems to me we are on the edge“ … Now the enemy is trying to seize the initiative from us … He is trying to force us to go completely on the defensive.“

Es gibt ein russisches Lied: Steppe rings umher …
(und sehr viel Eis und Schnee ab Januar !!!!)

Nach dem Auflösen der Beiden ins Vakuum der Glaskugel die dritte, gewichtigste Figur: General Zalushny, in einer ebenfalls aufsteigenden Luftblase zur Gefahr für den koksenden Komödainten Zelensky ernannt,

der den Russen zumindest den Sinn für die Realitäten zuerkennt: „They are not idiots“

FAZIT: Den aus der Glaskugel des britischen Meisters für Momente ans Licht gezauberten Generalen lässt man einhellig aus der CITY die nach Hilfe schreiende Losung als Sprechblase verkünden – die russische Offensive kommt ganz sicher im Januar, wenn nicht im Januar, dann im Februar, dann aber ganz sicher im März … usw. usw. Und dann kommen die WÖLFE !!!

Wer von den drei Figuren wird dann noch dem ECONOMIST für ein Interview zur Verfügung stehen ???

Berlin, Prenzlauer Berg, Weihnachten 2022

Präsident Putin – was schrieb er im Sommer 2021 (oder was ließ er schreiben?)

Den treuen Lesern meiner Blogs zur Erklärung: Pandemie, Kriegsdrohungen und Kriegsrealität der letzten Monate verhinderten die „normale“ intellektuelle Tätigkeit, die Erarbeitung und Veröffentlichung von Beiträgen zu historischen, kulturellen, philosophischen Themen.

Aber das „hohe demokratische Gut“ der Meinungsfreiheit und der grundgesetzlich verbürgte freie Zugang zu politischen Informationen – auch aus dem Ausland, auch aus Staaten, mit denen Deutschland und die EU sich nicht im Kriegszustand befinden – lässt mich heute „zur Feder greifen“ und das Ergebnis den Lesern meiner Blogs zur Kenntnis geben.

Der Hintergrund: im Sommer des vergangenen Jahres veröffentlichte der russische Präsident Putin einen Beitrag unter dem Titel „On the Historical Unity of Russians und Ukrainians“, dessen Hauptthesen sich wiederfinden in der Rede Putins zur Begründung des Antrags auf völkerrechtliche Anerkennung der Unabhängigkeit der Republiken Donezk und Lugansk vor dem russischen Parlament im letzten Monat.

Da es aufgrund der Blockierung des Zugangs zu offiziellen Medien Russlands durch das demokratische politische System der Bundesrepublik nicht möglich ist, jenen Beitrag Putins vom 12. Juli 2021 abzurufen (man möge es versuchen: en.kremlin.ru/d/66181), erlaube ich mir, den Text hier zum Zwecke der Beförderung der wissenschaftlichen Debatte und zur objektiven politischen Meinungsbildung wiederzugeben, den ich glücklicherweise damals abgespeichert hatte.

Quelle:  http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

Article by Vladimir Putin

”0n the Historical Unity  of Russians and Ukrainians“ 

July 12, 2021 17:00 

During the recent Direct Line, when I was asked about Russian-Ukrainian relations, I said  that Russians and Ukrainians were one people — a single whole. These words were not  driven by some short-term considerations or prompted by the current political context. It is  what l have said on numerous occasions and what I firmly believe. I therefore feel it  necessary to explain my position in detail and share my assessments of today’s situation. 

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the wall that has emerged in recent years  between Russia and Ukraine, between the parts of what is essentially the same historical  and spiritual space, to my mind is our great common misfortune and tragedy. These are,  first and foremost, the consequences of our own mistakes made at different periods  of time. But these are also the result of deliberate efforts by those forces that have always  sought to undermine our unity. The formula they apply has been known from time  immemorial — divide and rule. There is nothing new here. Hence the attempts to play  on the ”national question“ and sow discord among people, the overarching goal being  to divide and then to pit the parts of a single people against one another. 

To have a better understanding of the present and look into the future, we need to turn  to history. Certainly, it is impossible to cover in this article all the developments that have  taken place over more than a thousand years. But l will focus on the key, pivotal moments  that are important for us to remember, both in Russia and Ukraine. 

Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was  the largest state in Europe. Slavic and other tribes across the vast territory – from Ladoga,  Novgorod, and Pskov to Kiev and Chernigov — were bound together by one language (which  we now refer to as Old Russian), economic ties, the rule of the princes of the Rurik dynasty,  and — after the baptism of Rus — the Orthodox faith. The spiritual choice made by St.  Vladimir, who was both Prince of Novgorod and Grand Prince of Kiev, still largely determines  our affinity today.      

The throne of Kiev held a dominant position in Ancient Rus. This had been the custom  since the late 9th century. The Tale of Bygone Years captured for posterity the words of Oleg  the Prophet about Kiev, „Let it be the mother of all Russian cities.“ 

Later, like other European states of that time, Ancient Rus faced a decline of central rule  and fragmentation. At the same time, both the nobility and the common people perceived  Rus as a common territory, as their homeland. 

The fragmentation intensified after Batu Khan’s devastating invasion, which ravaged many  cities, including Kiev. The northeastern part of Rus fell under the control of the Golden  Horde but retained limited sovereignty. The southern and western Russian lands largely  became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which — most significantly — was referred  to in historical records as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Russia. 

Members of the princely and ”boyar“ clans would change service from one prince  to another, feuding with each other but also making friendships and alliances. Voivode  Bobrok of Volyn and the sons of Grand Duke of Lithuania Algirdas — Andrey of Polotsk  and Dmitry of Bryansk — fought next to Grand Duke Dmitry lvanovich of Moscow  on the Kulikovo field. At the same time, Grand Duke of Lithuania Jogaila — son  of the Princess of Tver — led his troops to join with Mamai. These are all pages of our  shared history, reflecting its complex and multi-dimensional nature. 

Most importantly, people both in the western and eastern Russian lands spoke the same  language. Their faith was Orthodox. Up to the middle of the 15th century, the unified church  government remained in place. 

At a new stage of historical development, both Lithuanian Rus and Moscow Rus could have  become the points of attraction and consolidation of the territories of Ancient Rus. lt so  happened that Moscow became the center of reunification, continuing the tradition  of ancient Russian statehood. Moscow princes — the descendants of Prince Alexander  Nevsky — cast off the foreign yoke and began gathering the Russian lands. 

In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, other processes were unfolding. ln the 14th century,  Lithuania’s ruling elite converted to Catholicism. In the 16th century, it signed the Union  of Lublin with the Kingdom of Poland to form the Polish—Lithuanian Commonwealth.  The Polish Catholic nobility received considerable land holdings and privileges  in the territory of Rus. In accordance with the 1596 Union of Brest, part of the western  Russian Orthodox clergy submitted to the authority of the Pope. The process of Polonization  and Latinization began, ousting Orthodoxy.       

As a consequence, in the 16—17th centuries, the liberation movement of the Orthodox  population was gaining strength in the Dnieper region. The events during the times  of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky became a turning point. His supporters struggled  for autonomy from the Polish—Lithuanian Commonwealth. 

ln its 1649 appeal to the king of the Polish—Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Zaporizhian  Host demanded that the rights of the Russian Orthodox population be respected, that  the voivode of Kiev be Russian and of Greek faith, and that the persecution of the churches  of God be stopped. But the Cossacks were not heard. 

Bohdan Khmelnytsky then made appeals to Moscow, which were considered by the Zemsky  Sobor. On 1 October 1653, members of the supreme representative body of the Russian  state decided to support their brothers in faith and take them under patronage. ln January  1654, the Pereyaslav Council confirmed that decision. Subsequently, the ambassadors  of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Moscow visited dozens of cities, including Kiev, whose  populations swore allegiance to the Russian tsar. Incidentally, nothing of the kind happened  at the conclusion of the Union of Lublin. 

In a letter to Moscow in 1654, Bohdan Khmelnytsky thanked Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich  for taking „the whole Zaporizhian Host and the whole Russian Orthodox world under  the strong and high hand of the Tsar“. lt means that, in their appeals to both the Polish king  and the Russian tsar, the Cossacks referred to and defined themselves as Russian  Orthodox people. 

Over the course of the protracted war between the Russian state and the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth, some of the hetmans, successors of Bohdan Khmelnytsky,  would „detach themselves“ from Moscow or seek support from Sweden, Poland, or Turkey.  But, again, for the people, that was a war of liberation. It ended with the Truce of Andrusovo  in 1667. The final outcome was sealed by the Treaty of Perpetual Peace in 1686.  The Russian state incorporated the city of Kiev and the lands on the left bank  of the Dnieper River, including Poltava region, Chernigov region, and Zaporozhye. Their  inhabitants were reunited with the main part of the Russian Orthodox people. These  territories were referred to as ”Malorossia“ (Little Russia). 

The name „Ukraine“ was used more often in the meaning of the Old Russian word  ”okraina“ (periphery), which is found in written sources from the 12th century, referring  to various border territories. And the word „Ukrainian“, judging by archival documents,  originally referred to frontier guards who protected the external borders.       

On the right bank, which remained under the Polish—Lithuanian Commonwealth, the old  orders were restored, and social and religious oppression intensified. On the contrary,  the lands on the left bank, taken under the protection of the unified state, saw rapid  development. People from the other bank of the Dnieper moved here en masse. They  sought support from people who spoke the same language and had the same faith. 

During the Great Northern War with Sweden, the people in Malorossia were not faced with  a choice of whom to side with. Only a small portion of the Cossacks supported Mazepa’s  rebellion. People of all orders and degrees considered themselves Russian and Orthodox. 

Cossack senior officers belonging to the nobility would reach the heights of political,  diplomatic, and military careers in Russia. Graduates of Kiev-Mohyla Academy played  a leading role in church life. This was also the case during the Hetmanate — an essentially  autonomous state formation with a special internal structure — and later in the Russian  Empire. Malorussians in many ways helped build a big common country — its statehood,  culture, and science. They participated in the exploration and development of the Urals,  Siberia, the Caucasus, and the Far East. Incidentally, during the Soviet period, natives  of Ukraine held major, including the highest, posts in the leadership of the unified state.  Suffice it to say that Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, whose party biography was  most closely associated with Ukraine, led the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)  for almost 30 years. 

In the second half of the 18th century, following the wars with the Ottoman Empire, Russia  incorporated Crimea and the lands of the Black Sea region, which became known  as Novorossiya. They were populated by people from all of the Russian provinces. After  the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire regained  the western Old Russian lands, with the exception of Galicia and Transcarpathia, which  became part of the Austrian — and later Austro-Hungarian — Empire. 

The incorporation of the western Russian lands into the single state was not merely  the result of political and diplomatic decisions. it was underlain by the common faith,  shared cultural traditions, and — I would like to emphasize it once again — language  similarity. Thus, as early as the beginning of the 17th century, one of the hierarchs  of the Uniate Church, Joseph Rutsky, communicated to Rome that people in Moscovia  called Russians from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth their brothers, that their written  language was absolutely identical, and differences in the vernacular were insignificant. He  drew an analogy with the residents of Rome and Bergamo. These are, as we know,  the center and the north of modern Italy.      

Many centuries of fragmentation and living within different states naturally brought about  regional language peculiarities, resulting in the emergence of dialects. The vernacular  enriched the literary language. Ivan Kotlyarevsky, Grigory Skovoroda, and Taras  Shevchenko played a huge role here. Their works are our common literary and cultural  heritage.

Taras Shevchenko wrote poetry in the Ukrainian language, and prose mainly  in Russian. The books of Nikolay Gogol, a Russian patriot and native of Poltavshchyna, are  written in Russian, bristling with Malorussian folk sayings and motifs. How can this heritage  be divided between Russia and Ukraine? And why do it?  The south-western lands of the Russian Empire, Malorussia and Novorossiya,  and the Crimea developed as ethnically and religiously diverse entities. Crimean Tatars,  Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Karaites, Krymchaks, Bulgarians, Poles, Serbs, Germans,  and other peoples lived here. They all preserved their faith, traditions, and customs. 

I am not going to idealise anything. We do know there were the Valuev Circular of 1863  an then the Ems Ukaz of 1876, which restricted the publication and importation of religious  and socio-political literature in the Ukrainian language. But it is important to be mindful  of the historical context. These decisions were taken against the backdrop of dramatic  events in Poland and the desire of the leaders of the Polish national movement to exploit  the „Ukrainian issue“ to their own advantage. I should add that works of fiction, books  of Ukrainian poetry and folk songs continued to be published. There is objective evidence  that the Russian Empire was witnessing an active process of development  of the Malorussian cultural identity within the greater Russian nation, which united  the Velikorussians, the Malorussians and the Belorussians. 

At the same time, the idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians  started to form and gain ground among the Polish elite and a part of the Malorussian  intelligentsia. Since there was no historical basis — and could not have been any,  conclusions were substantiated by all sorts of concoctions, which went as far as to claim  that the Ukrainians are the true Slavs and the Russians, the Muscovites, are not. Such  „hypotheses“ became increasingly used for political purposes as a tool of rivalry between  European states. 

Since the late 19th century, the Austro-Hungarian authorities had latched onto this  narrative, using it as a counterbalance to the Polish national movement and pro-Muscovite  sentiments in Galicia. During World War l, Vienna played a role in the formation of the so-called Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen. Galicians suspected of sympathies with Orthodox  Christianity and Russia were subjected to brutal repression and thrown into  the concentration camps of Thalerhof and Terezin.  

Further developments had to do with the collapse of European empires, the fierce civil war  that broke out across the vast territory of the former Russian Empire, and foreign  intervention. 

After the February Revolution, in March 1917, the Central Rada was established in Kiev,  intended to become the organ of supreme power. ln November 1917, in its Third Universal,  it declared the creation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) as part of Russia. 

ln December 1917, UPR representatives arrived in Brest-Litovsk, where Soviet Russia was  negotiating with Germany and its allies. At a meeting on 10 January 1918, the head  of the Ukrainian delegation read out a note proclaiming the independence of Ukraine.  Subsequently, the Central Rada proclaimed Ukraine independent in its Fourth Universal. 

The declared sovereignty did not last long. Just a few weeks later, Rada delegates signed  a separate treaty with the German bloc countries. Germany and Austria-Hungary were  at the time in a dire situation and needed Ukrainian bread and raw materials. In order  to secure large-scale supplies, they obtained consent for sending their troops and technical  staff to the UPR. In fact, this was used as a pretext for occupation. 

For those who have today given up the full control of Ukraine to external forces, it would be  instructive to remember that, back in 1918, such a decision proved fatal for the ruling  regime in Kiev. With the direct involvement of the occupying forces, the Central Rada was  overthrown and Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi was brought to power, proclaiming instead  of the UPR the Ukrainian State, which was essentially under German protectorate. 

ln November 1918 — following the revolutionary events in Germany and Austria-Hungary —  Pavlo Skoropadskyi, who had lost the support of German bayonets, took a different course,  declaring that „Ukraine is to take the lead in the formation of an All-Russian Federation“.  However, the regime was soon changed again. lt was now the time of the so-called  Directorate. 

ln autumn 1918, Ukrainian nationalists proclaimed the West Ukrainian People’s Republic  (WUPR) and, in January 1919, announced its unification with the Ukrainian People’s  Republic. In July 1919, Ukrainian forces were crushed by Polish troops, and the territory  of the former WUPR came under the Polish rule. 

In April 1920, Symon Petliura (portrayed as one of the „heroes“ in today’s Ukraine)  concluded secret conventions on behalf of the UPR Directorate, giving up — in exchange  for military support – Galicia and Western Volhynia lands to Poland. In May 1920, Petliurites entered Kiev in a convoy of Polish military units. But not for long. As early  as November 1920, following a truce between Poland and Soviet Russia, the remnants  of Petliura’s forces surrendered to those same Poles. 

The example of the UPR shows that different kinds of quasi-state formations that emerged  across the former Russian Empire at the time of the Civil War and turbulence were  inherently unstable. Nationalists sought to create their own independent states, while  leaders of the White movement advocated indivisible Russia. Many of the republics  established by the Bolsheviks‘ supporters did not see themselves outside Russia either.  Nevertheless, Bolshevik Party leaders sometimes basically drove them out of Soviet Russia  for various reasons. 

Thus, in early 1918, the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic was proclaimed and asked  Moscow to incorporate it into Soviet Russia. This was met with a refusal. During a meeting  with the republic’s leaders, Vladimir Lenin insisted that they act as part of Soviet Ukraine.  On 15 March 1918, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)  directly ordered that delegates be sent to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, including from  the Donetsk Basin, and that „one government for all of Ukraine“ be created  at the congress. The territories of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic later formed  most of the regions of south-eastern Ukraine. 

Under the 1921 Treaty of Riga, concluded between the Russian SFSR, the Ukrainian SSR  and Poland, the western lands of the former Russian Empire were ceded to Poland.  In the interwar period, the Polish government pursued an active resettlement policy,  seeking to change the ethnic composition of the Eastern Borderlands — the Polish name  for what is now Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and parts of Lithuania. The areas were  subjected to harsh Polonisation, local culture and traditions suppressed. Later, during  World War ll, radical groups of Ukrainian nationalists used this as a pretext for terror not  only against Polish, but also against Jewish and Russian populations. 

In 1922, when the USSR was created, with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic  becoming one of its founders, a rather fierce debate among the Bolshevik leaders resulted  in the implementation of Lenin’s plan to form a union state as a federation of equal  republics. The right for the republics to freely secede from the Union was included  in the text of the Declaration on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and,  subsequently, in the 1924 USSR Constitution. By doing so, the authors planted  in the foundation of our statehood the most dangerous time bomb, which exploded  the moment the safety mechanism provided by the leading role of the CPSU was gone,  the party itself collapsing from within. A „parade of sovereignties“ followed. On 8 December 1991, the so-called Belovezh Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth  of Independent States was signed, stating that „the USSR as a subject of international law  and a geopolitical reality no longer existed.“ By the way, Ukraine never signed or ratified  the ClS Charter adopted back in 1993. 

In the 1920’s-1930’s, the Bolsheviks actively promoted the ”localization policy“, which  took the form of Ukrainization in the Ukrainian SSR. Symbolically, as part of this policy  and with consent of the Soviet authorities, Mikhail Grushevskiy, former chairman of Central  Rada, one of the ideologists of Ukrainian nationalism, who at a certain period of time had  been supported by Austria-Hungary, was returned to the USSR and was elected member  of the Academy of Sciences. 

The localization policy undoubtedly played a major role in the development  and consolidation of the Ukrainian culture, language and identity. At the same time, under  the guise of combating the so-called Russian great-power chauvinism, Ukrainization was  often imposed on those who did not see themselves as Ukrainians. This Soviet national  policy secured at the state level the provision on three separate Slavic peoples: Russian,  Ukrainian and Belorussian, instead of the large Russian nation, a triune people comprising  Velikorussians, Malorussians and Belorussians. 

In 1939, the USSR regained the lands earlier seized by Poland. A major portion of these  became part of the Soviet Ukraine. In 1940, the Ukrainian SSR incorporated part  of Bessarabia, which had been occupied by Romania since 1918, as well as Northern  Bukovina. In 1948, Zmeyiniy Island (Snake Island) in the Black Sea became part of Ukraine.  In 1954, the Crimean Region of the RSFSR was given to the Ukrainian SSR, in gross  violation of legal norms that were in force at the time. 

I would like to dwell on the destiny of Carpathian Ruthenia, which became part  of Czechoslovakia following the breakup of Austria-Hungary. Rusins made up  a considerable share of local population. While this is hardly mentioned any longer, after  the liberation of Transcarpathia by Soviet troops the congress of the Orthodox population  of the region voted for the inclusion of Carpathian Ruthenia in the RSFSR or, as a separate  Carpathian republic, in the USSR proper. Yet the choice of people was ignored. In summer  1945, the historical act of the reunification of Carpathian Ukraine „with its ancient  motherland, Ukraine“ — as The Pravda newspaper put it – was announced. 

Therefore, modern Ukraine is entirely the product of the Soviet era. We know  and remember well that it was shaped — for a significant part — on the lands of historical  Russia. To make sure of that, it is enough to look at the boundaries of the lands reunited with the Russian state in the 17th century and the territory of the Ukrainian SSR when it left  the Soviet Union. 

The Bolsheviks treated the Russian people as inexhaustible material for their social  experiments. They dreamt of a world revolution that would wipe out national states. That is  why they were so generous in drawing borders and bestowing territorial gifts. lt is no longer  important what exactly the idea of the Bolshevik leaders who were chopping the country  into pieces was. We can disagree about minor details, background and logics behind  certain decisions. One fact is crystal clear: Russia was robbed, indeed. 

When working on this article, l relied on open-source documents that contain well-known  facts rather than on some secret records. The leaders of modern Ukraine and their external  „patrons“ prefer to overlook these facts. They do not miss a chance, however, both inside  the country and abroad, to condemn ”the crimes of the Soviet regime,“ listing among them  events with which neither the CPSU, nor the USSR, let alone modern Russia, have anything  to do. At the same time, the Bolsheviks‘ efforts to detach from Russia its historical  territories are not considered a crime. And we know why: if they brought about  the weakening of Russia, our ill-wishes are happy with that. 

Of course, inside the USSR, borders between republics were never seen as state borders;  they were nominal within a single country, which, while featuring all the attributes  of a federation, was highly centralized – this, again, was secured by the CPSU’s leading  role. But in 1991, all those territories, and, which is more important, people, found  themselves abroad overnight, taken away, this time indeed, from their historical  motherland. 

What can be said to this? Things change: countries and communities are no exception.  Of course, some part of a people in the process of its development, influenced by a number  of reasons and historical circumstances, can become aware of itself as a separate nation  at a certain moment. How should we treat that? There is only one answer: with respect! 

You want to establish a state of your own: you are welcome! But what are the terms? l will  recall the assessment given by one of the most prominent political figures of new Russia,  first mayor of Saint Petersburg Anatoly Sobchak. As a legal expert who believed that every  decision must be legitimate, in 1992, he shared the following opinion: the republics that  were founders of the Union, having denounced the 1922 Union Treaty, must return  to the boundaries they had had before joining the Soviet Union. All other territorial  acquisitions are subject to discussion, negotiations, given that the ground has been  revoked.       

In other words, when you leave, take what you brought with you. This logic is hard to refute.  I will just say that the Bolsheviks had embarked on reshaping boundaries even before  the Soviet Union, manipulating with territories to their liking, in disregard of people’s views. 

The Russian Federation recognized the new geopolitical realities: and not only recognized,  but, indeed, did a lot for Ukraine to establish itself as an independent country. Throughout  the difficult 1990’s and in the new millennium, we have provided considerable support  to Ukraine. Whatever „political arithmetic“ of its own Kiev may wish to apply, in 1991-  2013, Ukraine’s budget savings amounted to more than USD 82 billion, while today, it  holds on to the mere USD 1.5 billion of Russian payments for gas transit to Europe. If  economic ties between our countries had been retained, Ukraine would enjoy the benefit  of tens of billions of dollars. 

Ukraine and Russia have developed as a single economic system over decades  and centuries. The profound cooperation we had 30 years ago is an example  for the European Union to look up to. We are natural complementary economic partners.  Such a close relationship can strengthen competitive advantages, increasing the potential  of both countries. 

Ukraine used to possess great potential, which included powerful infrastructure, gas  transportation system, advanced shipbuilding, aviation, rocket and instrument engineering  industries, as well as world-class scientific, design and engineering schools. Taking over  this legacy and declaring independence, Ukrainian leaders promised that the Ukrainian  economy would be one of the leading ones and the standard of living would be among  the best in Europe. 

Today, high-tech industrial giants that were once the pride of Ukraine and the entire Union,  are sinking. Engineering output has dropped by 42 per cent over ten years. The scale  of deindustrialization and overall economic degradation is visible in Ukraine’s electricity  production, which has seen a nearly two-time decrease in 30 years. Finally, according  to IMF reports, in 2019, before the coronavirus pandemic broke out, Ukraine’s GDP per  capita had been below USD 4 thousand. This is less than in the Republic of Albania,  the Republic of Moldova, or unrecognized Kosovo. Nowadays, Ukraine is Europe’s poorest  country. 

Who is to blame for this? ls it the people of Ukraine’s fault? Certainly not. It was  the Ukrainian authorities who waisted and frittered away the achievements of many  generations. We know how hardworking and talented the people of Ukraine are. They can  achieve success and outstanding results with perseverance and determination. And these qualities, as well as their openness, innate optimism and hospitality have not gone.  The feelings of millions of people who treat Russia not just well but with great affection, just  as we feel about Ukraine, remain the same. 

Until 2014, hundreds of agreements and joint projects were aimed at developing our  economies, business and cultural ties, strengthening security, and solving common social  and environmental problems. They brought tangible benefits to people — both in Russia  and Ukraine. This is what we believed to be most important. And that is why we had  a fruitful interaction with all, l emphasize, with all the leaders of Ukraine. 

Even after the events in Kiev of 2014, l charged the Russian government to elaborate  options for preserving and maintaining our economic ties within relevant ministries  and agencies. However, there was and is still no mutual will to do the same. Nevertheless,  Russia is still one of Ukraine’s top three trading partners, and hundreds of thousands  of Ukrainians are coming to us to work, and they find a welcome reception and support. So  that what the „aggressor state“ is. 

When the USSR collapsed, many people in Russia and Ukraine sincerely believed  and assumed that our close cultural, spiritual and economic ties would certainly last,  as would the commonality of our people, who had always had a sense of unity at their core.  However, events — at first gradually, and then more rapidly — started to move in a different  direction. 

In essence, Ukraine’s ruling circles decided to justify their country’s independence through  the denial of its past, however, except for border issues. They began to mythologize  and rewrite history, edit out everything that united us, and refer to the period when Ukraine  was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as an occupation. The common tragedy of collectivization and famine of the early 1930s was portrayed as the genocide of the Ukrainian people. 

Radicals and neo-Nazis were open and more and more insolent about their ambitions. They  were indulged by both the official authorities and local oligarchs, who robbed the people  of Ukraine and kept their stolen money in Western banks, ready to sell their motherland  for the sake of preserving their capital. To this should be added the persistent weakness  of state institutions and the position of a willing hostage to someone else’s geopolitical will. 

I recall that long ago, well before 2014, the U.S. and EU countries systematically  and consistently pushed Ukraine to curtail and limit economic cooperation with Russia. We,  as the largest trade and economic partner of Ukraine, suggested discussing the emerging problems in the Ukraine-Russia-EU format. But every time we were told that Russia had  nothing to do with it and that the issue concerned only the EU and Ukraine. De facto  Western countries rejected Russia’s repeated calls for dialogue. 

Step by step, Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turning  Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia. inevitably, there came a time when the concept of „Ukraine is not Russia“ was no longer an option.  There was a need for the  ”anti-Russia“ concept which we will never accept. 

The owners of this project took as a basis the old groundwork of the Polish-Austrian  ideologists to create an ”anti-Moscow Russia“. And there is no need to deceive anyone that  this is being done in the interests of the people of Ukraine. The Polish-Lithuanian  Commonwealth never needed Ukrainian culture, much less Cossack autonomy. In Austria-Hungary, historical Russian lands were mercilessly exploited and remained the poorest.  The Nazis, abetted by collaborators from the OUN-UPA, did not need Ukraine, but a living  space and slaves for Aryan overlords. 

Nor were the interests of the Ukrainian people thought of in February 2014. The legitimate  public discontent, caused by acute socio-economic problems, mistakes, and inconsistent  actions of the authorities of the time, was simply cynically exploited. Western countries  directly interfered in Ukraine’s internal affairs and supported the coup. Radical nationalist  groups served as its battering ram. Their slogans, ideology, and blatant aggressive  Russophobia have to a large extent become defining elements of state policy in Ukraine. 

All the things that united us and bring us together so far came under attack. First  and foremost, the Russian language. Let me remind you that the new „Maidan“ authorities  first tried to repeal the law on state language policy. Then there was the law  on the „purification of power“, the law on education that virtually cut the Russian language  out of the educational process. 

Lastly, as early as May of this year, the current president introduced a bill on „indigenous  peoples“ to the Rada. Only those who constitute an ethnic minority and do not have their  own state entity outside Ukraine are recognized as indigenous. The law has been passed.  New seeds of discord have been sown. And this is happening in a country, as I have already  noted, that is very complex in terms of its territorial, national and linguistic composition,  and its history of formation. 

There may be an argument: if you are talking about a single large nation, a triune nation,  then what difference does it make who people consider themselves to be — Russians, Ukrainians, or Belarusians. I completely agree with this. Especially since the determination  of nationality, particularly in mixed families, is the right of every individual, free to make his  or her own choice. 

But the fact is that the situation in Ukraine today is completely different because it involves  a forced change of identity. And the most despicable thing is that the Russians in Ukraine  are being forced not only to deny their roots, generations of their ancestors but also  to believe that Russia is their enemy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the path  of forced assimilation, the formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive  towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass  destruction against us. As a result of such a harsh and artificial division of Russians  and Ukrainians, the Russian people in all may decrease by hundreds of thousands or even  millions. 

Our spiritual unity has also been attacked. As in the days of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,  a new ecclesiastical has been initiated. The secular authorities, making no secret of their  political aims, have blatantly interfered in church life and brought things to a split,  to the seizure of churches, the beating of priests and monks. Even extensive autonomy  of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church while maintaining spiritual unity with the Moscow  Patriarchate strongly displeases them. They have to destroy this prominent and centuries-old symbol of our kinship at all costs. 

I think it is also natural that the representatives of Ukraine over and over again vote against  the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the glorification of Nazism. Marches  and torchlit processions in honor of remaining war criminals from the SS units take place  under the protection of the official authorities. Mazepa, who betrayed everyone, Petliura,  who paid for Polish patronage with Ukrainian lands, and Bandera, who collaborated with  the Nazis, are ranked as national heroes. Everything is being done to erase from  the memory of young generations the names of genuine patriots and victors, who have  always been the pride of Ukraine. 

For the Ukrainians who fought in the Red Army, in partisan units, the Great Patriotic War  was indeed a patriotic war because they were defending their home, their great common  Motherland. Over two thousand soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Among them  are legendary pilot lvan Kozhedub, fearless sniper, defender of Odessa and Sevastopol  Lyudmila Pavlichenko, valiant guerrilla commander Sidor Kovpak. This indomitable  generation fought, those people gave their lives for our future, for us. To forget their feat is  to betray our grandfathers, mothers and fathers.       

The anti-Russia project has been rejected by millions of Ukrainians. The people of Crimea  and residents of Sevastopol made their historic choice. And people in the southeast  peacefully tried to defend their stance. Yet, all of them, including children, were labeled  as separatists and terrorists. They were threatened with ethnic cleansing and the use  of military force. And the residents of Donetsk and Lugansk took up arms to defend their  home, their language and their lives. Were they left any other choice after the riots that  swept through the cities of Ukraine, after the horror and tragedy of 2 May 2014 in Odessa  where Ukrainian neo-Nazis burned people alive making a new Khatyn out of it? The same  massacre was ready to be carried out by the followers of Bandera in Crimea, Sevastopol,  Donetsk and Lugansk. Even now they do not abandon such plans. They are biding their  time. But their time will not come. 

The coup d’état and the subsequent actions of the Kiev authorities inevitably provoked  confrontation and civil war. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that  the total number of victims in the conflict in Donbas has exceeded 13,000. Among them  are the elderly and children. These are terrible, irreparable losses. 

Russia has done everything to stop fratricide. The Minsk agreements aimed at a peaceful  settlement of the conflict in Donbas have been concluded. I am convinced that they still  have no alternative. In any case, no one has withdrawn their signatures from the Minsk  Package of Measures or from the relevant statements by the leaders of the Normandy  format countries. No one has initiated a review of the United Nations Security Council  resolution of 17 February 2015. 

During official negotiations, especially after being reined in by Western partners, Ukraine’s  representatives regularly declare their „full adherence“ to the Minsk agreements, but are  in fact guided by a position of „unacceptability“. They do not intend to seriously discuss  either the special status of Donbas or safeguards for the people living there. They prefer  to exploit the image of the „victim of external aggression“ and peddle Russophobia. They  arrange bloody provocations in Donbas. In short, they attract the attention of external  patrons and masters by all means. 

Apparently, and l am becoming more and more convinced of this: Kiev simply does not  need Donbas. Why? Because, firstly, the inhabitants of these regions will never accept  the order that they have tried and are trying to impose by force, blockade and threats.  And secondly, the outcome of both Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 which give a real chance  to peacefully restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine by coming to an agreement directly  with the DPR and LPR with Russia, Germany and France as mediators, contradicts  the entire logic of the anti-Russia project. And it can only be sustained by the constant cultivation of the image of an internal and external enemy. And I would add — under  the protection and control of the Western powers. 

This is what is actually happening. First of all, we are facing the creation of a climate of fear  in Ukrainian society, aggressive rhetoric, indulging neo-Nazis and militarising the country.  Along with that we are witnessing not just complete dependence but direct external control,  including the supervision of the Ukrainian authorities, security services and armed forces  by foreign advisers, military „development“ of the territory of Ukraine and deployment  of NATO infrastructure. It is no coincidence that the aforementioned flagrant law  on „indigenous peoples“ was adopted under the cover of large-scale NATO exercises  in Ukraine. 

This is also a disguise for the takeover of the rest of the Ukrainian economy  and the exploitation of its natural resources. The sale of agricultural land is not far off,  and it is obvious who will buy it up. From time to time, Ukraine is indeed given financial  resources and loans, but under their own conditions and pursuing their own interests, with  preferences and benefits for Western companies. By the way, who will pay these debts  back? Apparently, it is assumed that this will have to be done not only by today’s generation  of Ukrainians but also by their children, grandchildren and probably great-grandchildren. 

The Western authors of the anti-Russia project set up the Ukrainian political system in such  a way that presidents, members of parliament and ministers would change but the attitude  of separation from and enmity with Russia would remain. Reaching peace was the main election slogan of the incumbent president. He came to power with this. The promises  turned out to be lies. Nothing has changed. And in some ways the situation in Ukraine  and around Donbas has even degenerated. 

In the anti-Russia project, there is no place either for a sovereign Ukraine or for the political  forces that are trying to defend its real independence. Those who talk about reconciliation  in Ukrainian society, about dialogue, about finding a way out of the current impasse are  labelled as „pro-Russian“ agents. 

Again, for many people in Ukraine, the anti-Russia project is simply unacceptable.  And there are millions of such people. But they are not allowed to raise their heads. They  have had their legal opportunity to defend their point of view in fact taken away from them.  They are intimidated, driven underground. Not only are they persecuted for their  convictions, for the spoken word, for the open expression of their position, but they are also  killed. Murderers, as a rule, go unpunished.       

Today, the ”right“ patriot of Ukraine is only the one who hates Russia. Moreover, the entire  Ukrainian statehood, as we understand it, is proposed to be further built exclusively on this  idea. Hate and anger, as world history has repeatedly proved this, are a very shaky  foundation for sovereignty, fraught with many serious risks and dire consequences. 

All the subterfuges associated with the anti-Russia project are clear to us. And we will never  allow our historical territories and people close to us living there to be used against Russia.  And to those who will undertake such an attempt, I would like to say that this way they will  destroy their own country. 

The incumbent authorities in Ukraine like to refer to Western experience, seeing it  as a model to follow. Just have a look at how Austria and Germany, the USA and Canada live next to each other. Close in ethnic composition, culture, in fact sharing one language, they  remain sovereign states with their own interests, with their own foreign policy. But this does  not prevent them from the closest integration or allied relations. They have very conditional,  transparent borders. And when crossing them the citizens feel at home. They create  families, study, work, do business. Incidentally, so do millions of those born in Ukraine who  now live in Russia. We see them as our own close people. 

Russia is open to dialogue with Ukraine and ready to discuss the most complex issues. But  it is important for us to understand that our partner is defending its national interests but  not serving someone else’s, and is not a tool in someone else’s hands to fight against us. 

We respect the Ukrainian language and traditions. We respect Ukrainians‘ desire to see  their country free, safe and prosperous. 

l am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia.  Our spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries and have their origins  in the same sources, they have been hardened by common trials, achievements  and victories. Our kinship has been transmitted from generation to generation. It is  in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood  ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been and will be many  times stronger and more successful. For we are one people. 

Today, these words may be perceived by some people with hostility. They can be interpreted  in many possible ways. Yet, many people will hear me. And I will say one thing – Russia has  never been and will never be „anti-Ukraine“. And what Ukraine will be — it is up to its  citizens to decide.       

Publication status

Published in sections: News, Transcripts

Publication date: July 12, 2021, 17:00

Direct link: en.kremlin.ru/d/66181      

Aktualisiert am Donnerstag,

d. 8. September 2022,

Dr. Dieter Weigert,

Berlin – Prenzlauer Berg

Aus GENF: Eine freie Stimme der „freien Welt“ – gegen MAINSTREAM und gekaufte Journaille

Der COURRIER, eine Tageszeitung aus Genf, veröffentlicht auch manchmal Provokatives, Anti-Mainstream! Dazu gehört Geschäftssinn, Gefühl für die Red Lines, in Zeiten der NATO-Kriege ein Gespür, wieweit man in der neutralen Schweiz gehen kann, wenn man sich mit den großen Nachbarn Frankreich, Italien und Deutschland und der Wallstreet anlegt.

DENNOCH: Vor einigen TAGEN entschied sich die Redaktion für die Veröffentlichung einer solchen Provokation: ich zitiere –

ON NOUS ÉCRIT

Une guerre téléguidée 

LUNDI 22 AOÛT 2022 VOTRE LETTRE

Marcel gerber pointe le rôle des Etats-Unis dans le déclenchement du conglit russo-ukrainien.

Ein Leserbrief! Wer sich bei deutschen Leserbriefredaktionen schon einmal um die Veröffentlichung eines Beitrages bemüht hat, versteht die Hintergründe! Es muss passen !!! Aber es soll auch ANECKEN ! Ein sehr schmaler Grat – denn der Beitrag soll auch keinen der etwa 7 000 Leser davon abhalten, die Ausgabe des nächsten Tages zu kaufen.

Kriegszerstörungen im Stadion von Donezk

Hier nun der volle Text des Beitrages:

La guerre actuelle en Ukraine est une guerre provoquée et voulue par les USA contre la Russie, avec la complicité active du Royaume-Uni, de la France et du Canada. Leur vieux désir de dominer ce pays, de supprimer un adversaire (URSS ou Russie) et de piller ses immenses richesses naturelles est loin de dater de la période actuelle et a été très souvent avancé et théorisé par l’élite politique US. Un des buts de cette guerre est aussi d’obliger l’UE à couper tous liens économiques avec la Russie quelles qu’en soient les conséquences pour les peuples européens ou du tiers monde.

La Russie a tout fait pour éviter cette guerre programmée, en exigeant en particulier depuis 2015 que soient respectés les accords de Minsk et la non-appartenance de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN. Mission impossible puisque contraire à la politique imposée par les USA et leur bras armé l’OTAN. La Russie, avec son pouvoir corrompu et donc fragile, privilégie pourtant la stabilité (ou la coexistence pacifique comme l’URSS auparavant) afin que ce pouvoir ne soit pas mis en question.

Cette guerre US à débuté par la préparation et la réussite du coup d’Etat de 2014, qui a nécessité un investissement avoué de 5 milliards de dollars. Elle s’est poursuivie ensuite par les bombardements continus sur le Donbass et par l’encadrement et l’armement aux normes de l’OTAN de l’armée ukrainienne et de ses régiments néonazis, avec des instructeurs US, canadiens, anglais et français. Ainsi qu’avec des manœuvres militaires internationales sur le sol ukrainien et navales en mer Noire.

La guerre «chaude» actuelle date du 16 février dernier en conformité avec la décision du gouvernement Zelenski du printemps 2021 de reconquérir militairement le Donbass et la Crimée. Ce jour-là a commencé le bombardement massif des républiques autoproclamées, prélude à leur invasion par les troupes massées dans la région, régiments néonazis en tête, pour faire le «nettoyage», soit l’éradication des ressortissants russophones ayant soutenu l’autonomie de leur région dans le cadre ukrainien. Les rapports quotidiens de l’OSCE démontrent que les bombardements sur le Donbass ont été multipliés par 50 à partir du 16 février.

L’«opération spéciale» russe du 24 février a donc été rendue inéluctable, ce que savait pertinemment l’auteur réel de cette guerre, le gouvernement des USA, ce qui a permis à Biden et consorts de l’annoncer avec certitude en indiquant sa date à quelques jours près. Dès la fin de l’URSS, certains milieux dirigeants US annonçaient déjà une future guerre russo-ukrainienne…

Marcel Gerber,
Le Mont

Man muss sich den ersten Satz noch einmal auf der Zunge zergehen lassen:

„Der aktuelle Krieg in der Ukraine ist ein Krieg, der durch die USA mit der aktiven Komplizenschaft des Vereinigten Königreiches, Frankreichs und Kanadas gegen Russland provoziert und gewollt wurde.“

Wer in einer deutschen bürgerlichen Mainstream-Zeitung der letzten Wochen mir einen derartig brisanten Beitrag zuschicken kann, erhält in meiner Berliner Stammkneipe ein gutes großes Freibier !

Dr. Dieter Weigert, Berlin Prenzlauer Berg, 22. August 2022

Kleinrussen, Mythen, Kosaken, Ukrainer ?

Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine hat mein Weltbild erschüttert, die scheinbar gesicherten Kenntnisse über Russen, Ukrainer und Kosaken zu Pulver zerrieben. Aber dennoch – angesicht der vielfältigen historischen Wahrheiten, die man vergeblich in unseren Massenmedien sucht – sympatisiere ich auch im Sommer 2022 mit dem hymnischen Священная война !

Russe oder Kleinrusse ?
Bäuerin Russlands, der Ukraine, Kleinrusslands oder Neurusslands um 1900
ein klein-, weiß-, oder neurussischer Pope ?

Nehmen wir einige Lexika der letzten anderthalb Jahrhunderte zur Hand – „Allgemeines deutsches Conversations-Lexikon“ Bd. 8 erschienen 1849 in Hamburg. Setzen wir fort beim anerkannten Meyer, Bände 11 und 17 , erschienen in Leipzig 1905 und 1907, werfen wir eine Blick in den vierbändigen DDR-Meyer, Bd. IV, erschienen in Leipzig 1981, in Knaurs Lexikon von 1939, in den bundesrepublikanischen Herder von 1950.

Die Karte des zaristischen Südrussland

Südrußland im Jahre 1907

lässt keine inner-russischen Grenzen sichtbar werden. Die heutige Ukraine wird unter Kleinrußland lexikalisch erfasst:

Meyers Lexikon von 1907

„UKRAINE“ ist kein politisch-staatlicher Begriff, mehr ein Wort zur Umschreibung einer geographisch-historischen Situation:

Meyers Lexikon 1911

Zur begrifflichen Verwirrung trägt auch nicht unwesentlich bei, dass während der Jahrhunderte der kolonialen Okkupation von Territorien der heutigen Ukraine der Begriff der RUTHENEN ( aus der latinisierten Form) verwendet wurde.

Die „Ruthenen“ im Nordosten des Habsbuger „Völkergefängnisses“
Der Blick des kolonialen Okkupanten auf die „SCHÖNEN“ des Landes
„Völkerkunde“ der Habsburger

Jenen Lexikon-reifen Erkenntnissen liegen Jahrhunderte der zaristischen, osmanischen und habsburgischen Krieg um die Beute zugrunde, die an einer Karte aus der „Weltgeschichte, Bd. 5“, erschienen zu Sowjetzeiten in Moskau im Jahre 1958, in deutscher Sprache gedruckt in Berlin-DDR im Jahre 1966 (Verlag der Wissenschaften), ablesbar sind (zwischen S. 704 und 705)

Zum Verständnis – die dazu gehörige Legende:

Die Lexika des mittleren und späten 20. Jahrhunderts propagieren je nach staatlichen oder privatwirtschaftlichen Interessenlagen differenzierte Darstellungen.

Da ist die aus meiner Sicht interessantes Karte der frühen 50er Jahre in einem Oberschulatlas der DDR: die Großbauten der Kommunismus in der Sowjetunion – eindeutiger Schwerpunkt die Gebiete der UKRAINE !

Umkämpft heute: Kachowka, Melitopol, der „Südukrainische Kanal“, Saporoshje und Dnepropetrowsk

Besonders auffallend: das Bild Deutschlands zum Vergleich (rechts oben) zeigt keine innerdeutschen Grenzen – versteckter Hinweis, unwieweit die DDR selbst noch im Jahre 1954 sich dem Ziel der deutschen Einheit verpflichtet fühlte !!! Im selben Atlas eine Karte zur territorialen Situation der 20er/30er Jahre und darin ablesbar die sowjetischen Westgrenzen ohne große Gebiete der heutigen Ukraine :

Dem historischen Verständnis förderlich ist selbstverständlich ein Blick in ein deutsche Lexikon des Jahre 1939:

Die Sprache des gegenwärtigen Regimes in Kiew lässt eine verräterische Nähe zu

Jenseits der Elbe (aus Berliner Sicht) eine nun wieder unpolitische Sicht (HERDER 1950) – mit Schwerpunkt Volkswirtschaft:

Die späte DDR druckt die Grenzen der sowjetischen Unionsrepublik Ukraine selbstverständlich im vierbändigen MEYER von 1981 (Bd. IV) ab:

Der „kleine“ DDR-MEYER verweist natürlich in einer zweiten Karte auf die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Ukraine für die gesamte Sowjetunion:

Natürlich wird den Wirtschaftskarten eine Legende beigefügt – die uns auch 40 Jahre später hilft, das Kriegsgeschehen besser zu verstehen.

Belassen wir es dabei, um dem Lesen Gelegenheit zur freien Suche zu lassen.

Letztes Beispiel der Vielfal der lexikalischen Beschäftgung mit der Ukraine (lange vor WIKIPEDIA):

Le petit Larousse Grand Format 1995

Stimmt man mir aber zu, wenn ich nach dem Meditieren über diese geschichtlichen Fakten und dem Studium der aktuellen verwirrenden Situation in den Gebieten, die (noch) Ukraine genannt werden, wenn ich (ohne Zensur und Denunziantentum) leise summe: Священная война !

Dr. Dieter Weigert, Berlin Prenzlauer Berg, 19. Juli 2022